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TIRESIAS AND THE JUSTICES:  USING 
INFORMATION MARKETS TO PREDICT  
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
Miriam A. Cherry* & Robert L. Rogers** 
“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.” 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes1 
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In ancient Greek mythology, oracles and seers could foretell the ac-
tions of gods and kings.  With these predictions, ordinary citizens could 
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N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1142 
glimpse the future actions of their rulers, and the recipients treasured those 
insights.   
Such knowledge may be more than myth.  This Article explores the 
power of the information market, an economic instrument that allows 
groups of participants to merge their collective knowledge to make predic-
tions.  Specifically, we discuss the application of information markets to 
predicting Supreme Court decisions.  The implications are significant:  Su-
preme Court rulings determine issues critical to American politics and busi-
ness, ranging from the Fifth Amendment rights of property owners, to 
abortion and affirmative action, to claims of securities fraud.  The ability to 
know a probable Supreme Court outcome in advance can potentially create 
monetary value for practitioners, provide guidance for lower courts, and 
perhaps even influence the Supreme Court itself.   
Applying information markets to the Supreme Court offers a new way 
of understanding its rulings.  Current prediction efforts centered in legal 
methodology are largely bound up in individual normative argument, while 
formal theoretical models of decisionmaking grounded in political science 
are postdictive and tend to concentrate heavily on political ideology.2  In-
formation markets offer an alternative, one that will aggregate the predic-
tions of those who are knowledgeable about the Court’s decisionmaking 
into an information market that rewards correct analysis.3  An information 
market of this kind, which we propose naming Tiresias,4 should lead to 
more accurate forecasts of Supreme Court decisions and further demon-
strate the potential of information markets. 
To date, the intersection of law and information markets has been 
largely unexplored.  The most extensive discussion has concerned applying 
information markets not to courts, but to administrative agencies.5  Other 
potential legal applications of information markets, such as application to 
the judiciary, have yet to be discussed.  Similarly, theories of Supreme 
Court prediction could be developed further.  Current theories of Supreme 
Court prediction tend to focus on precedent-based models (legal theory) or 
to rely on the political ideology of the Justices (political or attitudinal the-
 
2  See infra Part II.A. 
3  The intent is to aggregate the knowledge of the community that follows the Supreme Court most 
carefully and closely.  To this end, the information market we propose here will have participation from 
professors, the Supreme Court bar, students taking courses on constitutional law, members of the media, 
and others who are knowledgeable about Supreme Court decisionmaking.  For more on the issue of par-
ticipation, see infra Part III.B.   
4  The most famous soothsayer in Ancient Greek mythology, Tiresias appears as a character in 
Sophocles’s tragedy Oedipus Rex as well as in Antigone.  Tiresias also features in the Odyssey, where he 
continues to make predictions from Hades.  See THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 215 
(1979).    
5  Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Administrative Decisionmak-
ing]; see also infra note 8 (describing legal scholarship that draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem). 
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ory).6  Although researchers at Washington University in St. Louis designed 
empirical studies based on these two models for the 2002 Supreme Court 
Term, the studies did not aggregate the opinions of experts in the way an in-
formation market would, and they must be revised to reflect new personnel 
on the Court.7   
Therefore, this Article presents the first extended discussion of how in-
formation markets might be used to predict Supreme Court outcomes.  Part 
I introduces the nascent field of information markets and describes its un-
derpinnings in economic theory.  Part II describes the existing models used 
to predict Supreme Court decisions, discusses their limitations, and explains 
why a Supreme Court information market should provide more accurate re-
sults.  Part III analyzes possible design models for Tiresias, including an 
open market with tradable securities and a proposal based on polling in cy-
berspace that would use alternative incentives.  It also discusses how 
Tiresias could offer competing market structures, which would allow for the 
comparison of the relative accuracy of different information market designs.  
Part IV deals with the implications of establishing an information market in 
the Supreme Court, examining the potential financial benefits to practitio-
ners, the effect on the Court itself, and the further development of informa-
tion markets. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION MARKETS 
Information markets organize and aggregate individual knowledge into 
a collective result.  Although information markets are a new idea, their cen-
tral insight—that the collective judgment of many can be wiser than the 
conclusions of one—are embedded in many of our legal institutions.  At 
trial, the legal system frequently entrusts determinations of guilt, innocence, 
and liability to a collective, the jury.8  On the appellate level, federal judges 
 
6  See infra Part II.A for further discussion of these models. 
7  Andrew D. Martin et al., Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 
PERSP. ON POL. 761, 761–66 (2004) (describing results of Washington University study); Theodore W. 
Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:  Legal and Political Science Approaches to Pre-
dicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (2004) (same).  See infra Part 
II.A for further discussion of this study. 
8  E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The jury’s role is, at least in part, premised on the idea that a group 
will be able to assess facts more accurately than an individual fact-finder.  The premise has mathemati-
cal support; the Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests that when choosing between two alternatives, one of 
which is correct, juries will reach the correct result more often than a single factfinder.  See Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1498 (1999) (listing 
Condorcet Jury Theorem as one factor that improves juries’ ability to assess facts with accuracy).  Of 
course, additional process-oriented justifications for the jury abound, including the idea that the jury is 
representative of diversity in society.  See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting:  Selecting Impar-
tial Juries Through Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 355, 358 (1999) (asserting im-
portance of jury that is representative cross-section of the community and discussing proposal for 
generating more inclusive juries).  But see Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds?:  Our Foolish 
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hear cases on three-judge panels, reducing the possibility of error and per-
haps tempering ideological leanings, and those same appellate judges sit en 
banc to eliminate intracircuit conflict or to state a position in a controversial 
case.9  States follow similar approaches in employing multimember appel-
late courts. 
Information markets take the idea of group decisionmaking much fur-
ther, greatly expanding the number of participants.10  Instead of a twelve-
member jury or a three-judge panel evaluating and weighing a factual as-
sessment about a past event, information markets allow thousands of people 
to join together to predict events, such as the outcome of a presidential elec-
tion.11  The following section first provides a general description of how in-
formation markets work to predict future events; it then describes 
successfully operating information markets.   
A. Harnessing Group Knowledge:  The Information Market 
Information markets12 pool individual knowledge and in the process 
produce remarkably accurate predictions.13  The economic literature has de-
fined an information market as a setting where “participants trade in con-
tracts whose payoff depends on unknown future events.”14  Each individual 
                                                                                                                           
Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 777–86 (1998) (criticizing juries for mistakes and 
confusion that lead to inconsistent verdicts).   
9  See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602, 1632 (2000) 
[hereinafter Abramowicz, En Banc] (proposing, innovatively, use of visiting panels from across circuits 
to sit en banc, and basing this proposal in part on Condorcet Jury Theorem); Jonathan Remy Nash, A 
Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 76–77 
(2003) (discussing voting patterns on multimember courts as well as game theory and the doctrinal 
paradoxes that can accompany voting on such courts).  
10  Juries and multimember courts engage in a deliberative function, which is valued as helping to 
achieve more accurate outcomes as well as for process reasons.  Information markets, however, are not 
deliberative, and information markets employ incentives for correct predictions.  Although there are 
these significant differences, we mention juries and multimember courts to emphasize that group deci-
sionmaking is commonly accepted in our legal system.      
11  See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text (discussing how Iowa Electronic Markets have 
been predicting the outcomes of elections since 1988). 
12  Information markets are also known in the economic literature as “prediction markets,” “artificial 
markets,” or “idea futures.”  Robin Hanson, Impolite Innovation:  The Technology and Politics of  ‘Ter-
rorism Futures’ and Other Decision Markets 5 (Nov. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://hanson.gmu.edu/impolite.pdf [hereinafter Hanson, Impolite Innovation].   
13  Id. at 4 (“Orange Juice futures improve on National Weather Service forecasts, horse race mar-
kets beat horse race experts, Oscar markets beat columnist forecasts, gas demand markets beat gas de-
mand experts, stock markets beat the official NASA panel at fingering the guilty company in the 
Challenger accident, election markets beat national opinion polls, and corporate sales markets beat offi-
cial corporate forecasts.”). 
14  Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., May 2004, at 107, 108, 
available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1027.  Note that the term “in-
formation market” has had a wide variety of meanings among various legal commentators.  Until re-
cently, this term was used in legal settings to denote a number of different concepts.  The term was used 
to describe new types of financial opportunities that the advent of the internet created.  See, e.g., Ruth L. 
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participating in the information market is motivated by self-interest to assert 
what he or she believes is the most likely outcome.  Those with little 
knowledge risk loss—economic, reputational, or merely wasted time.  As a 
result, these uninformed participants will be less willing to participate in the 
market.15  In contrast, those who have been able to obtain information or 
who are able to apply advanced modes of analysis to information will real-
ize financial or reputational gains, and they will therefore have incentives to 
continue their participation in the information market.  
The point of a particular information market, however, is not to pro-
vide financial or reputational incentives randomly to the participants.16  The 
organizers structure the market to gather information that will aid in deter-
mining the outcome of a future event.17  Each individual acts to maximize 
his or her own reward.  At the same time, the organizers of the market as-
semble the results and in turn may receive rewards from harvesting the in-
formation generated.   
The theory behind information markets is loosely related to the semi-
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis (“EMH”), which holds 
that, in a properly functioning capital market, the prices of securities will re-
flect all relevant publicly available information.18  The price of a security on 
the market contains and encodes a significant amount of information, in-
cluding beliefs about the efficacy of management, the potential for future 
products, and the possibility of market expansions.19  In other words, most 
markets have a “price discovery” function, aggregating information and 
predictions into the current price of that security.20  In traditional capital 
                                                                                                                           
Okediji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace:  Information Markets and the Construction of Proprietary 
Rights, 44 B.C. L. REV. 545, 547 (2003).  The term has also been used to describe the practices of com-
panies that collect information about individuals surfing the Internet and then resell that information.  
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2082 
(2004) (using “information market” in the context of personal data).  Interesting as these concepts and 
areas are, they are not the same type of “information market” described and analyzed here. 
15  See Hanson, Impolite Innovation, supra note 12, at 5.  
16  To say that there is an overarching “point” to a market beyond gains or losses of individual trad-
ers is not a novel concept.  After all, the justification for stock markets is that they readily raise capital 
for business, and therefore fund all sorts of technological innovation.  See, e.g., Claudio Michelacci & 
Javier Suarez, Business Creation and the Stock Market, 71 REV. ECON. STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (discuss-
ing how the stock market “encourages business creation, innovation, and growth by allowing the recy-
cling of ‘informed capital’”).  
17  It is the deliberate structure, the intention to capture information, which differentiates information 
markets from typical capital markets.  Capital markets also generate a level of prediction through the 
process of price discovery, but this is a secondary effect, not the primary goal of such markets. 
18  Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:  A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 
383, 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 552–53 (1984). 
19  See Fama, supra note 18, at 383. 
20  See generally Michael T. Chng, A Model of Price Discovery and Market Design:  Theory and 
Empirical Theory, 24 J. FUTURE MARKETS 1107, 1108–10 (2004) (describing price discovery function 
performed by derivatives markets). 
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markets, however, the information-seeking aspects are, to a certain degree, 
by-products of trading and raising capital.  In contrast, this information-
seeking is the sole reason for the information market’s existence.  
Two examples of information pooling can be found in a familiar envi-
ronment—the law school.  All law students and professors are intimately 
familiar with law school final examinations, which typically include at least 
one “issue spotter” question.21  The “issue spotter” requires students to read 
a complicated hypothetical fact pattern, extract the legal issues, analyze the 
issues based on legal precedents studied in the course, and present a conclu-
sion.22  The issues, however, are buried within the fact pattern.  A large por-
tion of the examination is based on the individual student’s ability to “spot” 
the salient issues.  
As those of us who have graded a set of law school exams know, no 
one student is ever able to spot every issue that is present on the exam.23  
Even the best answer in the class omits issues and resolves some of the is-
sues incorrectly.  When the student examinations are aggregated, however, 
they cover all of the issues present in the fact pattern, and even though indi-
vidual papers make mistakes, overall the majority of the class reaches the 
correct legal conclusion.  Taken as a whole, the student papers often spot 
issues in addition to the ones that the professor deliberately included in the 
question.  The law school class, in the aggregate, possesses more informa-
tion than the student who had the best performance on the examination. 
Another example of information pooling in law school involves the use 
of new technology to “poll” the class for answers.  The Classroom Perform-
ance System (“CPS”) allows the instructor to pose a multiple-choice ques-
tion to the class.24  Students view the question on an overhead screen, and 
then choose the answer that they believe is correct by keying an answer into 
their individual pads.  An infrared receiver records and tallies the responses, 
allowing the instructor to view, instantly, the number of students who 
choose a particular answer.25  In so doing, the CPS system provides an in-
stant mechanism for aggregating the knowledge of the class.  By counting 
 
21  In many law school courses, final examinations often count for one hundred percent of the grade 
and are the subject of much anxiety, especially during the first year.  See SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (reissue 
ed. 1988). 
22  RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE:  HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW 
SCHOOL EXAMS 117–49 (1999) (describing methods for spotting issues successfully). 
23  This individual perception was corroborated by an informal questioning of the Cumberland Law 
School faculty. 
24  For more on the use of the classroom performance system, see Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Tak-
ing back the Law School Classroom:  Using Technology to Foster Active Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 551 (2004).     
25  A benefit of CPS is that, by requiring periodic student input, it stimulates active learning.  In ad-
dition, CPS also gives students practice with the type of questions they will encounter on the multistate 
bar examination.  Students enjoy CPS because they receive immediate feedback on their performance.  
It is useful for an instructor, who can determine whether more time is needed on a particular topic de-
pending on the outcome of the poll. 
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correct answers toward class participation, a professor can offer positive in-
centives to students to come to class prepared.26  Even though one particular 
student may not have read the assignment, because of these incentives, the 
majority of the class will have.  The class as a whole tends to do well, and 
typically selects the right answer, despite the presence of a few unprepared 
individuals.27   
In his recent popular book, The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki 
explains numerous ways in which such collective knowledge can be em-
ployed.28  Surowiecki describes an experiment in which individuals tried to 
guess the correct number of jelly beans in a jar, for which they would win a 
prize.29  The experimenter took the individual guesses and averaged them, 
resulting in a number only a few away from the actual number of jelly 
beans.30  The average of all the guesses was extremely accurate.31  Whether 
individuals are asked to estimate the location of a sunken submarine,32 to 
guess the weight of an ox,33 or to help a contestant on the game show Who 
Wants to Be a Millionaire,34 groups provide accurate answers to questions 
that most individuals would not be able to answer on their own.  The next 
section of this Article examines currently operating information markets in 
further depth so that the reader can appreciate the predictive power of in-
formation markets and their potential for the Supreme Court.     
 
26  Positive incentives for being prepared can be provided rather than penalizing unprepared students 
through the embarrassment of the traditional Socratic method.  See Miriam A. Cherry, A Tyrannosaurus 
Rex Aptly Named “Sue”:  Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach Contract Defenses, 81 N.D. L. REV. 295 
(2005) (arguing for substitution of innovative teaching methods in lieu of Socratic method). 
27  See Results for Contracts I Students, Fall 2004 (unpublished data, on file with authors).  Unlike 
traditional polls, where the instructor asks the students to raise their hands to indicate which answer they 
choose, with CPS, each student votes on her keypad independently.  Asking the students to raise their 
hands could trigger an “information cascade”; that is, the students look around the room before raising 
their hands, and might change their answer if they perceive that the answer they chose will put them in 
the minority.  On information cascades, see infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text.   
28  JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xiv, 3–4 (2004). 
29  Id. at 5; Jack L. Treynor, Market Efficiency and the Bean Jar Experiment, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
May–June 1987, at 50.  
30  Treynor, supra note 29, at 50. 
31  In Treynor’s experiment, the jar had 850 jelly beans.  The average of the group’s guesses was 
871, and of the fifty-six who made guesses, only one was more accurate than the group average.  Id. 
32  SUROWIECKI, supra note 28, at xx–xxi. 
33  Id. at xi–xiii. 
34  On the television program Who Wants to Be a Millionaire contestants had to answer trivia ques-
tions in multiple-choice format.  Each contestant had several “lifelines” that they could use, including 
narrowing the options, telephoning a friend, and polling the audience.  Although the first two options 
were often helpful, the audience for the television program was the most helpful of all, achieving a 
ninety-one percent success rate.  Cf. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
723, 734 n.22 (2001) (providing Who Wants to Be a Millionaire poll of the audience as illustration of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem). 
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B. Successfully Functioning Information Markets 
At present, numerous information markets are successfully at work.  
Perhaps most notably, especially during the past two hotly contested presi-
dential elections, is the Iowa Electronic Markets (“IEM”).35  Since 1988, the 
IEM, started by academics at the University of Iowa Business School, has 
been predicting the outcomes of various elections.36  An individual trader is 
limited to a $500 investment, so although the financial stake of any one per-
son in the outcome is modest, each still has a financial incentive for making 
a correct prediction.37  
The IEM has predicted the outcomes of elections more accurately than 
most polls, beating the polls seventy-six percent of the time.38  This accu-
racy occurs despite the fact that researchers at the University of Iowa have 
concluded that many of the market participants exhibit a strong political 
bias.39  Apparently, the market is able to correct for these biases through ar-
bitrage.40  Sensing an opportunity for profit, arbitrageurs temper the ideo-
logical biases that some of the participants bring with them when they make 
their initial investment in the IEM.41    
Another successfully functioning information market is the Hollywood 
Stock Exchange (“HSX”), which has more than 400,000 registered ac-
 
35  See, e.g., Jordan Erin, Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result, DES MOINES REG., 
Nov. 10, 2004, at B5, available at 2004 WL 90800910.  The IEM trades at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/ 
iem/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).  
36  Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESULTS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (Charles Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., forth-
coming 2006), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/BFNR_2000.pdf [hereinafter Berg et 
al., Results].  The IEM has also expanded into predictions further afield from its base of political predic-
tions.  Id. at 7 n.10; Jordan Erin, U of I Markets Tapped to Predict Flu Activity, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 
22, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL 100489665. 
37  See Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation:  Lessons from the Iowa 
Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2003) [hereinafter 
Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets]. 
38  Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets 12–13, 33 tbl.3 
(July 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/forecasting. 
pdf [hereinafter Berg et al., Accuracy].  
39  Berg et al., Results, supra note 36, at 5.  The average trader is younger, more likely to be a white 
male, Republican, and of a higher socioeconomic status than the average voter.  Berg et al., Accuracy, 
supra note 38, at 10.    
40  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:  A Behavioral 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 140 n.15 (2002) (“[Arbitrage is] the “proc-
ess by which informed traders buy or sell in such a way as to eliminate any mispricing caused by unin-
formed trading.  For example, when a stock becomes overvalued because uninformed traders are bidding 
it up, informed traders would sell, hence moving the price back to its rational expectations equilib-
rium.”).   
41  Berg et al., Results, supra note 36, at 6. 
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counts.42  The HSX is a “fantasy stock market,” allowing trades in “virtual” 
money, and is successful in predicting which movies will be blockbusters 
and which will be box office bombs.43  Although traders set the market price 
for shares of a movie’s stock, the price is tied to the movie’s financial per-
formance.44  One month after the film’s release, the stock “delists” and the 
shareholders are cashed out.45  Shareholders receive an amount of virtual 
money pegged to the amount of real money that the movie made during that 
period.  Traders may also sell their stocks short if they believe that a 
movie’s stock values are overpriced.46  In addition, the HSX allows traders 
to guess the outcomes of the Academy Awards, and these aggregated pre-
dictions have proved to be startlingly accurate.47   
Other successful information markets are smaller, limiting participa-
tion to a particular organization.  For example, Hewlett Packard (“HP”) 
used an internal information market to predict monthly sales volumes.48  
 
42  The Hollywood Stock Exchange, http://www.hsx.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2006); see also DAVID 
M. PENNOCK ET AL., THE POWER OF PLAY:  EFFICIENCY AND FORECAST ACCURACY IN WEB MARKET 
GAMES 5 (2001), available at http://artificialmarkets.com/am/pennock-neci-tr-2000-168.pdf. 
43  Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty:  Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 
VA. L. REV. 2043, 2070 (2004) (discussing the creation of “virtual” property in online games); Norm 
Alster, It’s Just a Game, but Hollywood Is Paying Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 3, at 34, 
available at http://www.hsx.com/about/press/15709.pdf; see Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets, supra 
note 37, at 593 (“HSX offers good predictions of a film’s gross receipts before release and, relatively 
speaking, even better predictions after opening weekend—when a large number of traders have some 
information in the form of (or at least the possibility of) observing the finished film on screen, along 
with audience reactions.  Apparently, studios have begun relying on these estimates to structure the dis-
tribution of their films.”); see also Russ Ray, Prediction Markets:  Betting on Risk Management, RISK 
MGMT., Apr. 1, 2004, at 58, available at 2004 WL 66261967. 
44  See Hollywood Stock Exchange, http://www.hsx.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2006); see also 
PENNOCK ET AL., supra note 42 at 6. 
45  PENNOCK ET AL., supra note 42 at 6.  Delisting refers to the cessation of trading. 
46  Id.  In traditional financial markets, a short sale is defined as the  
sale of borrowed shares by an investor who expects the stock’s price to decline.  If it does, the in-
vestor profits on the difference between the amount realized when the shares were sold and the 
lower price paid to “cover” the short position.  If, however, the stock goes up, the investor’s loss is 
limited only by how quickly the short sale is covered.   
Priscilla Ann Smith, Short-Sale Data Can Signal More than Pessimism, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1986, § 1, 
at 125, available at 1986 WL-WSJ 240163.  For further discussion of short-selling as well as financial 
derivatives, and their importance for the study of corporate law, see Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives 
to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599, 604–05 (2000).  
47  In a widely publicized story in 2000, The Wall Street Journal queried members of the Academy 
in order to formulate predictions and publish a story touting the winners in advance of the awards show.  
Despite obtaining this inside information, the newspaper underperformed against the HSX, which pre-
dicted more accurately which nominees would win academy awards.  See Levmore, Simply Efficient 
Markets, supra note 37, at 594; Lisa Gubernick, And the Winner Is, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2000, at W1, 
available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3022872; see also Justin Lahart, Trading the Oscars, CNN/MONEY, Mar. 
11, 2003, http://www.hsx.com/about/press/030311_1.htm.  
48  Kay-Yut Chen & Charles R. Plott, Information Aggregation Mechanisms:  Concept, Design and 
Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem 6 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 1131, 2002), 
available at http:// www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Kay-Yut_Chen/paper/ms020408.pdf. 
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The information market in this case was thin; that is, it encompassed a rela-
tively small number of participants, only twenty to thirty.49  The market en-
compassed participants from across departments, and these participants 
remained anonymous.50  Despite the small numbers of participants, the in-
formation market produced more accurate forecasts than those that the 
company had put forward officially.51  And these markets have not been 
alone in their predictive successes.52 
II. PREDICTING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS:  THEORIES IN NEED OF A 
MARKET 
Having discussed the accuracy of information markets in other con-
texts, the Article now turns to Supreme Court predictions.  This Part begins 
by identifying the current methods of predicting Supreme Court decisions 
and analyzing the limitations of these models.  It then discusses the factors 
that lead information markets to operate successfully and why an informa-
tion market like Tiresias will have those factors.  We also identify potential 
political and structural problems that could lead to market failure and dis-
cuss how an information market might overcome those obstacles.   
A. The Limitations of Existing Prediction Models 
Before turning to the specific issue of predicting Supreme Court out-
comes, we wish briefly to place such predictions and their limitations in 
their larger legal context.  Decisionmakers in our justice system often use 
predictive or probabilistic reasoning to arrive at conclusions.53  For exam-
ple, criminal sentencing decisions are, at least implicitly, determined by as-
sessments of how dangerous particular defendants will be in the future,54 
 
49  Id. at 5, 10. 
50  Id. at 10. 
51  Id. at 12–16.  Part of this difference might be explained by a failure of individuals to share infor-
mation across departments, but this also might be the result of incentives that skew official sales predic-
tions.  For example, there might be extreme pressure from top management to reach a particular sales 
goal; at the same time, individual salespeople might have incentives to underestimate goals so that they 
can later “look good” when they exceed the sales quota.  Cf. Gary F. Goldring, Mandatory Disclosure of 
Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1535 (1981) 
(discussing underestimates in corporate projections); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shift-
ing, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1413, 1413 n.295 (1999) (discussing 
pressure on employees to meet sales goals).  
52  See Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets for Markets:  Origins and Subjects of Infor-
mation Markets, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339, 372–75 app. A (2006) (appendix listing and describing all 
currently trading information markets open to the public). 
53  For further discussion of predictive or probabilistic decisionmaking in the legal system, see Bar-
bara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball:  Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Indi-
vidualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1434–36 (1979).   
54  See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2003) 
(“[Determinations of future dangerousness] permeate the government’s implementation of its police 
power.  To name a few examples, death penalty determinations, non-capital sentencing, sexual predator 
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tort law damages may be awarded based on an elevated risk of future ill-
ness,55 and advocates try to anticipate the tactics of opposing counsel as 
well as the behavior of the judge.  Conversations between lawyers often re-
volve around predictions of notable trials or the direction that a particular 
court seems to be leaning.  
Despite its pervasiveness in the law, legal academia has largely dele-
gated prediction of court decisions to the realm of law review articles,56 
newspaper stories and op-eds,57 and weblogs58 devoted to discussing indi-
vidual Supreme Court cases and presenting guesses about potential out-
comes.  In legal scholarship, it appears that law review articles or student 
notes containing predictions on an individual case are so ubiquitous as to 
comprise their own “genre” of academic writing.59  Some pieces contain a 
straightforward prediction, attempting to guess how the Justices will vote 
and what the outcome will be.  Other writings seem to be more normative 
than they are predictive, advancing a desired outcome and advocating a po-
sition that the Supreme Court should take in future cases.60  Other articles 
                                                                                                                           
commitment, civil commitment, pretrial detention, and investigative stops by the police often or always 
depend upon dangerousness assessments.”).  
55  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1903 (2000) (“[A] 
‘futures’ claim is one where a claimant cannot presently prove a causal connection between an injury 
and a supposed source of injury, but nevertheless suspects or fears that he or she is suffering injury that 
has its origin in the suspect source.”); Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Futures 
Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2002) (describing recognition of claims for en-
hanced risk of disease due to toxic exposure).  
56  See, e.g., Michael Higginbotham & Kathleen Bergin, Why the University of Michigan Should Win 
in Grutter and Gratz, 63 LA. L. REV. 697 (2003) (presenting reasons court should uphold affirmative ac-
tion and phrasing such argument in terms of legal brief); Bobbie L. Stratton, Comment, A Prediction of 
the United States Supreme Court’s Analysis of the Defense of Marriage Act, After Lawrence v. Texas, 
46 S. TEX. L. REV. 361 (2004).  
57  See Linda Greenhouse, Press Room Predictions, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 781, 782 (2004) (describing 
how author generally gives the “reader [her] best judgment on what is likely to happen next” after hear-
ing oral argument); see also William Safire, Office Pool, 1997, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at 9, avail-
able at 1996 WLNR 4399470; Leonard B. Simon, A Surer Way to Achieve Diversity and Fairness, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 4, 2003, at B7, available at 2003 WL 6587900. 
58  See, e.g., Ignatz, http://sheldman.blogspot.com/2002_08_01_sheldman_archive.html#80395325 
(Aug. 18, 2002, 14:02 EST).   
59  See supra note 56.  This genre persists despite warnings that articles of this type will become rap-
idly outdated.  See EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING:  LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT 
NOTES, AND SEMINAR PAPERS 30 (2003).  Volokh lists, under topics to avoid, “Topics that the Supreme 
Court or the Congress is likely to visit shortly” and advises “do not write on a topic that you think the 
Court will resolve shortly, in the hope of getting your article published before the Court hears the 
case . . . .  [O]nce the Court acts, your article will be largely ignored, since scholars and lawyers will be 
looking for articles that consider the new decision, rather than articles that predate it.”). 
60  See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Call the Foul Against Title IX, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 38 
(arguing that Supreme Court should recognize a cause of action for retaliation under Title IX by revers-
ing Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education); Timothy J. Dowling, 
Joint Justice:  No, Congress Has Banned It, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 35.  
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focus on the jurisprudential approach of each specific Justice,61 and still oth-
ers discuss the process of coalition building and dissent writing.62   
At present, the current ways of predicting the outcomes of Supreme 
Court cases among lawyers and legal scholars is individualized and difficult 
to assess in terms of accuracy.  Legal academic approaches tend to be indi-
vidualized in the sense that approaches tend to focus on the votes of specific 
Justices and on individual cases or types of cases rather than on predicting 
outcomes more generally.  At the same time, individual scholars work in 
isolation, and these individual hunches, guesses, and judgments are never 
aggregated or integrated.  Finally, because they are so decentralized, tradi-
tional legal predictions are not verifiable or falsifiable in any statistical 
sense.63 
Beyond individual ad hoc predictions, political scientists have devel-
oped more comprehensive decisionmaking models.  These formal theoreti-
cal models, discussed in more detail below, combine prediction with 
analysis of past patterns and examination of ongoing processes of deci-
sionmaking.  As the legal system is precedent based64 and ostensibly values 
 
61  See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s Unwritten 
Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19 (2000) (analyzing Justice Scalia’s reliance on tradition in opin-
ions); Judith Olans Brown et al., The Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day O’Connor, 32 IND. L. REV. 1219, 
1220 (1999) (analyzing jurisprudence of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to determine her view on the 
“woman question”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?:  What Justice Cla-
rence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931 (2005) (analyz-
ing jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas and arguing, provocatively, that Justice Thomas 
articulates a distinct voice of Black conservatism); Laura K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice:  What 
William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 543–47 (1996) (describing 
Rehnquist’s life prior to coming to the Court and analyzing his formative experiences as a Supreme 
Court law clerk); David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade:  Some Thoughts About Her Con-
tributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (2004) (analyzing Justice 
Ginsburg’s procedural decisions).  This is a mere sample of the legal scholarship available on the juris-
prudence of the Justices.   
62  See generally Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological Position as a Variable in the Author-
ing of Dissenting Opinions on the Warren and Burger Courts, in STUDIES IN U.S. SUPREME COURT 
BEHAVIOR 279, 285–86 (Harold J. Spaeth & Saul Brenner eds., 1999); Robert E. Riggs, When Every 
Vote Counts:  5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 1900–90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 
693 n.79 (1993) (exploring coalitions within the court).  
63  Lest these criticisms of traditional legal scholarship be seen as being unduly harsh, note that one 
of the Authors has written pieces that could be subjected to all of these criticisms.  See Cherry, supra 
note 60. 
64  See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS:  THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 5 (2004) (discussing the importance of precedent).  Fried observes: 
No merely human judge would have the time or the intellect to think every case out afresh.  Doc-
trine not only mediates between first principles and particular results along the timeless dimension 
of inference, but it in fact—if not in logical necessity—provides continuity between a particular 
decision and those that have gone before.  It is respect for precedent that makes for continuity in 
doctrine.  Such continuity gives Supreme Court decisions the regularity and predictability they 
must have to make the Court’s exercise of power both be and seem to be lawlike and acceptable.   
Id.; see also Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (“[T]he doc-
trine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.”). 
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consistency,65 analysis of decisionmaking methods are necessarily interre-
lated with prediction of future outcomes.  Any model that attempts to ana-
lyze past decisions necessarily has its explanatory powers tested against 
actual performance benchmarks (that is, the outcome of Court decisions 
where the model’s explanation could offer a prediction).  An explanation of 
a process of decisionmaking may have little impact if it has no predictive 
power.   
Two existing formal theories of Supreme Court decisionmaking domi-
nate the field:  the legal model and the political (or attitudinal) model.66  The 
legal model, as its name suggests, focuses on legal argumentation and 
precedent-based reasoning.  In essence, the legal model “postulates that the 
decisions of the Court are based on the facts of the case in light of the plain 
meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers, prece-
dent, and in a balancing of societal interests.”67   
According to the legal model, the Justices make decisions by studying 
the relevant texts and synthesizing the legal arguments, ultimately arriving 
at the correct conclusion.  A Supreme Court justice could be employing a 
strict constructionist,68 historical,69 natural law,70 or flexible approach71 to 
constitutional interpretation and decisionmaking, but these types of inter-
 
65  Of course, there are some instances where the court has suddenly effected a doctrinal reversal.  
For example, at one time, the Supreme Court did not enforce mandatory arbitration contracts in the con-
text of employee civil rights claims.  See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974).  
However, in 2001, the Supreme Court determined that such claims could be arbitrated.  See Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119, 123 (2001); see also Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the 
Dark?:  Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employ-
ment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1076–79 (2004) (describing Supreme Court as moving from skepti-
cism to support of arbitration). 
66  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
32 (1993).  Commentators over the years have acknowledged that any model attempting to explain and 
predict the decisions of the Supreme Court will contain simplifications.  See Lon L. Fuller, An After-
word:  Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1604 (1996).  It is this simplification 
that is the strength as well as the limitation of theory generally.  Steven J. Schulhofer, The Feminist 
Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2153 (1995) (describing the limits of theory by 
stating that “broad propositions do not solve concrete cases; or they solve too many cases very poorly”).  
On the other hand, the more variables that one attempts to include in a theory, the more the theory be-
comes “a theory of everything,” diminishing its explanatory power. 
67  SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 66, at 32.     
68  See generally Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 751 (1987); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519, 519 (2003).  
69  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
331, 338–39 (2004). 
70  See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2090–93 (2001). 
71  See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Color-Blind, Creed-Blind, Status-Blind, Sex-Blind, 14 HUM. 
RTS. 30, 35–36 (1987) (“By design, the great clauses of the Constitution had been broadly phrased to 
keep their noble principles adaptable to changing conditions and changing concepts of social justice 
. . . .”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1154 
pretation would still conform to the legal model.  Similarly, a Supreme 
Court Justice could be examining original intent,72 legislative and/or 
framer’s intent,73 or engaging in a balancing of societal interest.74  These 
modes of interpretation would all be part of the legal decisionmaking 
model. 
The legal model, and the idea of “discoverable” law in general, how-
ever, has its limitations.  Fundamentally, the legal model undervalues the 
fact that the cases that reach the Supreme Court are truly the “hard cases,” 
the cases where there is strong precedent—and strong argument—on both 
sides.  Often a circuit split indicates sound arguments on either side of a 
particular issue.75  Further, the legal model fails to account for political in-
fluences and the ideological leanings of the President who appointed the 
Justices.  After postmodernism and the critical legal studies movement,76 the 
idea of a discoverable and objective “law” has been called into question, if 
not significantly undermined.77   
In contrast to the legal model, the political, or attitudinal, model fo-
cuses almost exclusively on the political ideology of the Justices.78  Political 
affiliation or inclination counts more than any other factor, according to this 
model.  As Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth explain in their book, The Su-
preme Court and the Attitudinal Model,  
[the] model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in the light of the 
facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.  
Simply put, Rehnquist [voted] the way he [did] because he [was] extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he [was] extremely lib-
eral.79  
The limitations of the political or attitudinal model, however, are also 
apparent.  If the Justices voted entirely on the basis of the ideology of the 
President who appointed them, predicting outcomes would be an extremely 
easy task.  Given the examples of Justices who have changed their ideologi-
 
72  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92–95 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
73  See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669–71 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing).  
74  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
75  See e.g., Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 743 (2004) (granting certiorari in 
order to resolve circuit split).  
76  See generally Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 
YALE L.J. 461, 461–62 (1984).  
77  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION, at xix–xxi (2004) (discussing 
Bush v. Gore and describing “worrisome” aspects of political ideology in determining outcomes of 
cases). 
78  SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 66, at 65. 
79  Id. 
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cal position after their appointment—Justices Earl Warren80 and David 
Souter81 are arguably examples—and those Justices who vote conserva-
tively on some issues and relatively liberally on others—such as Justice 
Kennedy82—this model does not have a complete predictive capacity either.    
Scholars have advanced several other formal theoretical models to ex-
plain and predict patterns of Supreme Court decisionmaking:  the instru-
mental model, strategic model, and the behavioralist model.  We discuss 
each of these models in turn.   
The instrumental model examines the decisionmaking process in light 
of the Supreme Court’s position vis-à-vis the other branches of government.  
The Supreme Court might be influenced in its interpretation of a statute by 
the potential fear of reversal from the current legislature,83 but might also be 
influenced by other negative reactions from the legislature, such as “threat-
ened impeachment, jurisdiction restrictions, other legislation limiting court 
powers and reducing the courts’ resources.”84   
The strategic model, on the other hand, suggests that judges act in 
ways that maximize their incentives and their prestige.  As Judge Richard 
Posner has explained, the strategic model examines the decisions of judges 
in terms of the incentives that are provided to them; judges, especially 
lower court judges, may seek elevation or other professional advancement 
or esteem.85  However, the strategic model loses some force with the Su-
preme Court because it is fairly difficult to imagine a higher professional 
zenith for an American judge or legal practitioner.86  
The behavioralist model attempts to explain Supreme Court decision-
making on the basis of the personal characteristics of the Justices.87  Some 
factors that would be relevant to a behavioralist analysis would be the indi-
 
80  Paul Finkelman, You Can’t Always Get What You Want . . . :  Presidential Elections and Supreme 
Court Appointments, 35 TULSA L.J. 473, 481 (2000) (describing instances where appointee eventually 
reached different ideological conclusions from appointing President). 
81  See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 77, at 24–25 (describing conservative disappointment with both 
Justice Souter and Justice Stevens, who “are sometimes regarded as having abandoned their conserva-
tive principles”). 
82  It is a common perception that Justice Kennedy is a swing vote on the Court, as revealed by a 
journal search on Westlaw for “Kennedy” and “swing vote,” which turned up 330 hits.  
83  Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmak-
ing, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1450–52 (2001). 
84  Id. at 1460. 
85  See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?  (The Same Thing as Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).  
86  Although rare, it is by no means impossible for a Justice to aspire to other offices.  Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes became the secretary of state under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin 
Coolidge, and also unsuccessfully ran for President.  See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief 
Justice:  My Life in the Law Series, 52 DUKE L.J. 787, 799–801 (2003) (describing the career of Justice 
Hughes). 
87  See, e.g., Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisionmaking, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1551 (1966). 
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vidual Justice’s upbringing, religion,88 regional identity,89 and law school 
training.  Other factors to consider would be the individual’s practice ex-
periences before being appointed to the bench,90 or an individual’s race, so-
cial class, or gender.91   
Recently, a group of researchers from Washington University in St. 
Louis (“Wash U”) empirically tested the predictive capabilities of these two 
dominant models, the legal model and the political/attitudinal model, for the 
2002 Term.92  The portion of the study dealing with the legal model asked 
individual legal experts to make predictions on the cases.93  The attitudinal 
political model consisted of a computer program that made predictions with 
a decision tree based on the ideological leanings of each of the nine Jus-
tices.94  Thus, the Wash U experiment was not only designed as an exercise 
in prediction, but also a contest to determine whether the legal model or the 
political/attitudinal model was better at explaining Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking. 
The Wash U researchers chose the experts who would participate in the 
legal model based on a number of factors.95  The group consisted of sev-
enty-one academics and twelve appellate attorneys, including a number of 
former Supreme Court law clerks.96  Each expert, however, predicted only 
between one and three cases, with the exception of one expert who pre-
dicted four cases.97  The cases were in the predictor’s area of expertise, and 
authors matched cases to participants based on “issue preference forms” 
completed by the experts.98   
 
88  For a discussion of religion and the Justices see, for example, ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH 
JUSTICES (1988).  
89  See, e.g., ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK:  A BIOGRAPHY 3–37 (1994) (discussing regional-
ism and Justice Hugo Black’s southern roots); Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism:  
A Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393, 2461 (2001) (describing Justice 
Black’s southern background). 
90  The work performed in practice may inform some of the ideology that a particular Justice brings 
to the bench.  For example, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s insistence on procedural rules for criminal de-
fendants was influenced by his illustrious career as a civil rights attorney.  See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, 
The Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1134.  Similarly, Justice Gins-
burg’s practice experience included her efforts to obtain women’s rights through heightened scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause, a view she then was able to bring to the Court.  See Herma Hill Kay, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2, 19–20 (2004).  
91  See supra note 61 (listing sources that analyze feminist jurisprudence of Justices O’Connor and 
Ginsburg). 
92  Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:  Legal and Political Science 
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (2004). 
93  Id. at 1169. 
94  Id. at 1163–64. 
95  Id. at 1168. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. at 1168 n.59. 
98  Id. 
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The examination of the political/attitudinal model was composed of a 
computer program that coded the cases according to six variables.99  The re-
searchers created classification trees based on decisions prior to the 2002 
term.100  For each case, the model would initially apply two classification 
trees to predict whether the outcome would be unanimously “conservative” 
or unanimously “liberal.”101  If neither, they would apply nine classification 
trees—one for each justice.102   
The political/attitudinal statistical model made accurate predictions in 
75% of the cases, whereas the individual legal model was correct 59.1% of 
the time.103  Overall, the Wash U machine beat the experts.  One preliminary 
conclusion to draw from these results is that the political model contains 
greater explanatory power than does the legal model.104  
Although the Wash U study employed a sophisticated empirical and 
statistical approach to predict Supreme Court cases, it had a significant 
limitation.  With only three participants predicting a case, the expert opin-
ions were not aggregated the way that they would be in an information 
market.105  Given the small number of experts involved in each case, it 
would be premature to conclude that the computer model had triumphed 
over the decisions of human beings, and it would be hasty to trumpet the 
ascendance of the political model over the legal model.   
In fact, if anything, trying to determine whether the legal or attitudinal 
model is most accurate may be asking the wrong question.  Relying on any 
single model may necessarily neglect elements of truth in another model.  A 
better approach might be to look for a method of incorporating all existing 
models of Supreme Court prediction and decisionmaking.  Tiresias should 
do so.  
Tiresias would not be confined strictly to either the legal or politi-
cal/attitudinal model, or any other model for that matter.  Participants in the 
information market are free to consider, and give appropriate weight to, any 
model they believe will have predictive insight.  Participants can use a vari-
ety of models, combining them and applying them where it seems that one 
or another will have greater predictive power.  Tiresias participants will be 
experts, many of whom have clerked for the Supreme Court, many more of 
whom argue cases before the Court, or study the Court extensively.  As 
 
99  Id. at 1163.  The variables were: “(1) circuit of origin; (2) issue area of the case; (3) type of peti-
tioner (e.g., the United States, an employer, etc.); (4) type of respondent; (5) ideological direction (lib-
eral or conservative) of the lower court ruling; and (6) whether the petitioner argued that a law or 
practice is unconstitutional.”  Id. 
100  Id.  
101  Id. at 1165. 
102  Id.  
103  Id. at 1171.   
104  Id. 
105  It would be fascinating to set up a contest between the Wash U political decision-tree based 
computer model and Tiresias. 
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such, they will be familiar with the factors that persuade the Justices, the 
ideological leanings that the Justices bring with them to the cases, and the 
social or personal issues that might influence a particular Justice to rule a 
certain way on a case.   
Each participant in Tiresias conceivably may have a different approach 
to the cases and conclude that some factors deserve more weight than oth-
ers.  Some participants, perhaps following the hypotheticals of Lon Fuller, 
may choose wildly idiosyncratic factors on which to base their predic-
tions.106  But the information-aggregating function of Tiresias will even out 
these differences, smoothing the different approaches into a group conclu-
sion.  The Wash U political model’s votes could even be integrated into 
Tiresias, with a computerized political component averaged along with the 
opinions of the experts.  In that sense, Tiresias would function as a “meta-
model,” able to assimilate the predictive abilities of other models to reach 
more accurate conclusions. 
B. The Information Market as Improvement in Supreme Court Predictions 
Information markets can provide a significant improvement over other 
predictive models, as scholars have recognized in other contexts.  Most no-
tably, Professor Michael Abramowicz has advocated governmental use of 
information markets to improve the policymaking process.107  Professor 
Abramowicz proposes using information markets to predict insolvency of 
financial institutions,108 make budgetary forecasts for administrative agen-
cies,109 and allow for more efficient regulation by skipping notice-and-
comment rulemaking.110   
Just as Professor Abramowicz proposes using information markets in 
the administrative law context, we propose such a market for the Supreme 
Court.111  This is important because the Supreme Court decides significant 
 
106  Ruger et al., supra note 92, at 1171 (presenting hypotheticals with bizarre factors, such as that 
the presence of electric current in some rooms in the courthouse might be predictive of outcome of par-
ticular case). 
107  Abramowicz, Administrative Decisionmaking, supra note 5, at 982. 
108  Id. at 987–88.  
109  Id. at 990–91.  
110  Id. at 993–95.  
111  This Article is the first full-length discussion that suggests creating a Supreme Court information 
market, although one attempt was made to create a game, the Supreme Court Fantasy League.  The 
League, however, was proposed purely as entertainment, with no effort to gather or aggregate any of the 
information that would be collected.  See Dan Michalski, The Court as Sport?  You Bet:  In This Fantasy 
League, Players Wear Robes and Go by the Names Scalia and Ginsburg, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov. 8, 
2002, at 9. At this time, the website touted as running the market, http://www.lawpsided.com/update3. 
htm, is defunct.  Likewise, one commentator mentioned the idea of an information market as part of a 
laundry-list critique of the Wash U study, but failed to develop the idea.  See Gregory A. Caldeira, Ex-
pert Judgment Versus Statistical Models:  Explanation Versus Prediction, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 777, 779 
(2004). 
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issues of law for the nation,112 occupies a highly visible and respected posi-
tion among American governmental institutions,113 and draws the attention 
of a large number of well-informed observers.114    
Will such an information market work for the Supreme Court?  We be-
lieve that it will, for the reasons discussed in the remainder of this section.  
Economic literature identifies the factors that contribute to making an in-
formation market successful,115 as well as those factors that could lead to 
market failure.116  This section next discusses how the Tiresias model would 
incorporate the desirable elements of successful information markets while 
avoiding identified problems.   
1. Elements for Success.—The Supreme Court is particularly suitable 
for an information market in a number of ways.  First, the number of deci-
sionmakers is limited to the nine Justices.  Rather than confront the task of 
predicting how 250 million people will vote on election day, as the IEM 
does,117 with the Supreme Court only nine votes need be predicted.  Further, 
for many of the Justices, ideological preferences as well as past voting pat-
terns may guide predictions.118  Adherence to precedent also constrains the 
universe of possible outcomes.  Finally, the market is not being asked to an-
swer questions with a broad array of outcomes, such as when human clon-
ing will take place119 or the outcomes of geopolitical events in the middle 
east.120  Rather, there are typically only two options available for any Su-
 
112  WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 75–89 (1996) (listing most important Su-
preme Court cases). 
113  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the 
Academic Commentator, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 943, 947 (1999) (describing respected position of the Su-
preme Court among the general public). 
114  This is not to say that information markets could not be applied to other courts in our judicial 
system.  The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal or state supreme courts could each have individual 
information markets, which practitioners in those jurisdictions would likely find extremely useful.  One 
issue would be the possibility of a small number of participants, because thin markets can lead to 
inaccurate predictions or the possibility of skewing or manipulation.  
115  See infra Section II.B.1. 
116  See infra Section II.B.2. 
117  See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.  
118  This is not always the case, of course.  Although many Justices on the current Court have served 
on the bench for decades, Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. lacks an extensive record that might inform 
predictions.  But it is, for example, fairly certain that Justices Thomas and Scalia will vote against gov-
ernment-sponsored affirmative action programs, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–78 (2003) 
(Thomas, J. dissenting), and it is also fairly certain that Justice Ginsburg will vote to strike down abor-
tion restrictions, see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  The real contest will be in predicting the 
“swing votes,” which were that of Justice O’Connor (when she was on the Court) and now currently that 
of Justice Kennedy, and in predicting those votes of any of the Court’s new members who had not ruled 
on a particular topic. 
119  This and similar questions are currently being debated on the Foresight Exchange.  See supra 
note 52. 
120  Similar questions were to be part of DARPA’s proposed markets.  See infra notes 139–146 and 
accompanying text. 
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preme Court case:  affirmance or reversal.121  Thus, the limited range of pos-
sibilities in the context of the Supreme Court makes prediction easier 
because the problem is more bounded and the variables to consider are 
fewer. 
Predicting the outcome of a Supreme Court decision is different from 
predicting whom a President will nominate as a Justice, a task at which the 
information markets have not been particularly successful.  Part of the rea-
son the market was less successful at predicting John Roberts’s nomination 
was that the decision was made solely by one person (President George W. 
Bush), the President had a large range of options for potential nominees, the 
White House disclosed only limited information about the possibilities, and 
the President had absolute discretion in choosing among the options.  While 
information markets do an excellent job of aggregating information and 
making predictions, they are not mind-reading devices.  Fortunately, that is 
not necessary for predicting the outcome of Supreme Court decisions.  Su-
preme Court outcomes depend far more on precedent, and they are reached 
not by one individual’s unbounded choices but rather by at least five Jus-
tices who must agree to a given result.  These constraints limit the Court’s 
options and thus make the outcome more predictable.122  
In addition to these specific characteristics of the Supreme Court that 
lend themselves to establishing an information market, the economic litera-
ture has identified several broad factors that tend to make information mar-
kets more accurate.123  These general factors are diversity, independence and 
decentralization, and coordination.124  The following discussion analyzes 
how the Tiresias model might incorporate these characteristics. 
The first characteristic of successful information markets is diversity.  
In this context, “diversity” means that the information in the market origi-
nates from as many sources as possible.  While no one source by itself pro-
vides the information necessary to predict the outcome on its own, as a 
 
121  Of course there are also other less common outcomes, such as dismissal for an improvident grant 
of certiorari.  For the sake of simplicity in creating a new market, Tiresias will not initially try to predict 
such results, though as the market develops, it would be possible to expand the range of possible predic-
tions to cover less common Court outcomes, predictions about the treatment of specific legal issues 
within a case, or even predictions about the cases that the Court is likely to hear.  
122  The information market run by Kevin McGuire of the University of North Carolina reflected the 
conventional Beltway wisdom on the day of the nomination, which initially favored Judge Edith Clem-
ent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  See, e.g., Andres R. Martinez, Put Your Money 
Where Your Hunch Is:  Stock Market Trades in Fake Money, Potential Nominees to High Court, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (N.C.), July 19, 2005, at 3A (identifying Judge Clement as the frontrunner as of 
that Monday afternoon).  On Tuesday, July 19, the markets switched to indicating the selection of Judge 
John Roberts Jr. of the D.C. Circuit.  This was before the President’s formal announcement that evening, 
but apparently after leaks about who the nominee would be.  For a blog discussion of the accuracy of the 
information markets on this question, see Posting of Jim Lindgren to the Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_07_17-2005_07_23.shtml (July 20, 2005, 03:12 EST). 
123  SUROWIECKI, supra note 28, at 10. 
124  Id. 
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whole, all of the pieces of information that will lead to an accurate predic-
tion exist.  While some of these pieces of information are hidden to all but 
the most careful observers,125 other pieces of information that would osten-
sibly seem to be the most obvious choices may not have the most predictive 
power.  Yet the market will reward those who are most prescient, and they 
in turn, with their self-interested choices, will make the market intelligent.   
Because information about Supreme Court cases is publicly available, 
it is the participants’ methods of analysis that will be most important to the 
market.  Given the variety of theoretical approaches to determining the out-
come of a case, some participants will believe one particular fact of the case 
is determinative, while another group of participants will concentrate on a 
particular prior holding, while yet another will take into account potential 
political ramifications and what those mean to society, or perhaps the pres-
tige attached to the Court as an institution.126  The model will include practi-
tioners and academics, who often have different perspectives.  Ideally, 
Tiresias will have hundreds of participants, from law students to journalists 
to senior attorneys, with a variety of experiences.  Diversity improves the 
quality of prediction and information markets generally,127 and the Tiresias 
model will be set up to encourage such diverse participation. 
Independence and decentralization are two interrelated factors that also 
contribute to the success of a given information market.  Independence 
means that the participants in the market arrive at their predictions on their 
own, attempting to make the best guesses possible on the basis of the in-
formation that they have available.128  Therefore, the rewards and penalties 
that flow from the market give incentives to each participant to be accurate.  
A related element is decentralization; in a decentralized system, “many of 
the important decisions are made by individuals based on their own local 
and specific knowledge”129  An example of decentralization is at work in 
 
125  To illustrate this point, consider the typical mystery novel.  Several suspects have differing mo-
tives, but there are no direct eyewitnesses and instead several contradictory clues and stories.  Mean-
while, the detective interviews the witnesses, collecting the evidence from disparate sources.  Typically 
one or more sources is biased or incomplete, but because the detective is observant and logical, these 
sources are discounted, filtered out like so much background noise.  Through a process of ratiocination, 
the detective is able to determine the pieces of evidence that contradict each other, figure out who is ly-
ing, and catch the criminal.  
126  For example, diversity of sources is extremely important in reconstructing a past event in the 
historical context.  In dealing with sources, the historian must question the point of view, the biases, and 
the limited information that each source brings along with it.  Rather like the good historian, or the ob-
servant detective, the key is synthesis—putting together disparate pieces of information and coordinat-
ing that information so that biased or misleading information is discarded.  For more on this point, see 
generally SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES:  UNWARRANTED SPECULATIONS (2d reprint ed. 1992) 
(describing reconstruction of narrative as well as techniques of historical writing). 
127  SUROWIECKI, supra note 28, at 28–33. 
128  Id. at 40–42. 
129  Id. at 71.  In fact, in debating the benefits of capitalism versus a planned economy, one of the 
major economic arguments against a central planned economy is the idea that one authority could not 
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Linux and other free software programs that allow individual users to cor-
rect problems with the software.130  Another example is Wikipedia, where 
individual users create and edit an online encyclopedia.131  
The Tiresias model will be both independent and decentralized.  Each 
participant in the market will reach his or her independent conclusions 
about what the likely outcome of a Supreme Court case is to be.  As de-
scribed more fully in Part III, the model includes rewards for predicting out-
comes correctly, and thus each individual has the incentive to choose to the 
best of his or her ability.132  Further, the system is decentralized in that the 
decisions are made on a local, individual level, rather than having votes or 
the results dictated by a hierarchy. 
The final element common to well-functioning information markets is 
coordination of the participants.  James Surowiecki describes how pedestri-
ans walking down a crowded sidewalk engage in coordination.133  The pe-
destrians manage not to collide, not because anyone tells them where to 
walk, but rather because individuals decide where they will walk based on 
their best guess of where others will choose to walk.134  This same type of 
coordination was demonstrated by game theorist Thomas Schelling in a fa-
mous experiment where he instructed individuals to imagine that they were 
supposed to meet someone in New York City on a certain day, but had not 
been told the time or the location of the meeting.135  When asked where and 
when they would go to meet the other person, the majority of the subjects 
responded that they would meet at Grand Central Station at noon.136   
For our model, the website performs the necessary coordinating func-
tion.  In part, the currently successfully functioning information markets 
owe their success to the growth of the Internet.137  The fact that the majority 
                                                                                                                           
effectively set prices simply because it would not have the same capacity for price discovery as the mar-
ket would.  See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM:  AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 137–
42 (J. Kahane trans., rev. ed. 1951); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 
519 (1945). 
130  See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 
374–75 (2002) (describing how individuals working in a decentralized fashion can accomplish signifi-
cant tasks, including programmers updating the Linux operating system, “thousands of individuals [col-
laborating] . . . to map Mars’s craters,” and a “quarter of a million people [collaborating] on creating the 
most important news and community site currently available on technology issues”). 
131  See Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.org (last visited June 12, 2006). 
132  See infra Part III. 
133  SUROWIECKI, supra note 28, at 84–85. 
134  Id. at 85. 
135  See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55–56 (1980). 
136  Id. at 55 n.1. 
137  See Cherry & Rogers, supra note 52, at 372–75 app. A (listing currently functioning information 
markets, all of which are contained on Internet portals).  See generally NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING 
DIGITAL (1996).  For examples of how the Internet has influenced everyday routine, see, for example, 
Lee Gomes, Blogs Have Become Part of the Media Machine That Shapes Politics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 
2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56920763 (describing rise of weblogs as shapers of public 
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of the markets are online leads to a certain ease in participation and trading, 
as well as a greater number of participants.  Further, computerized record 
keeping reduces the transaction costs for recording and tracking votes.138  
Finally, computerized record keeping will also enable statistical analysis of 
the data to determine accuracy rates.    
2. Avoiding Pitfalls.—Although information markets have enormous 
predictive potential as discussed above,139 they also have provoked political 
controversy, at least in the proposed application to terrorist attacks.  Much 
of the criticism stems from negative publicity surrounding the ill-fated De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) proposed informa-
tion markets on Middle East policy.140  In the summer of 2003, DARPA 
announced a program, FutureMap, which proposed information markets to 
predict events in the Middle East as well as potential terrorist attacks.141  
Two markets were to comprise FutureMap:  one composed of policy ex-
perts and law enforcement officials, cutting across internal government 
agencies and relying on classified information, and the other, the Policy 
Analysis Market (“PAM”), open to the general public.142   
The proposal, especially PAM, met with sharp criticism from political 
leaders.  Opponents feared that terrorists might “game the market,” either 
committing violent activities for profit or manipulating the information 
market to hide their unlawful activities.143  Indeed, Senators Ron Wyden and 
Bryon Dorgan claimed that PAM was “offensive” and “ridiculous,”144 while 
Senator Tom Daschle criticized PAM because it “could provide an incen-
tive actually to commit terrorism.”145  In addition, some wondered about the 
morality of allowing traders to take positions that would result in profit only 
                                                                                                                           
opinion); Tracie Rozhon, Ubiquity; In the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at G1, available at 2004 
WLNR 13350431 (describing Internet shopping and commerce). 
138  See Michael Abramowicz, Cyberadjudication, 86 IOWA L. REV. 533, 571–72 (2001) (describing 
ways in which the Internet can perform a coordinating function for market activity). 
139  Hanson, Impolite Innovation, supra note 12, at 5–6; see also Abramowicz, Administrative Deci-
sionmaking, supra note 5, at 936–38 (proposing, in various intriguing ways, the use of information mar-
kets in the policy formulation/administrative law context); Robert W. Hahn, Using Information Markets 
to Improve Policy 1–2 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper No. 04-18, 2004) 
(same). 
140  See, e.g., Harebrained Scheme to Bet on Terrorism Deserved to Die, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 2, 
2003, at D6, available at 2003 WL 61757580; see also Carl Hulse & Thom Shanker, Senators Want to 
Block Spending on Terrorist Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at A20, available at 2003 WLNR 
5652045.   
141  Tim Harford, All Bets Are off at the Pentagon, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at 14; You Bet Your 
Life:  Futures Markets Won’t Solve a Real Intelligence Problem, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at 10. 
142  See Hanson, Impolite Innovation, supra note 12, at 13.   
143  See Harford, supra note 141. 
144  Ken Guggenheim, Pentagon Terrorism Market Riles Lawmakers, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2003, at 
11, available at 2003 WL 60112739. 
145  Harford, supra note 141. 
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if a terrorist attack occurred or worried that the market might provide poten-
tial terrorists with ideas or focus them on particular targets.146   
Although PAM was well intentioned, even the prospect of betting on 
terrorism provoked a visceral negative response.  As discussed more fully 
in Part IV, however, a market dealing with the Supreme Court should not 
suffer from these visceral reactions or become politically controversial.  If 
anything, the positive publicity from a project of Tiresias’s scope should 
encourage further experimentation with information markets. 
In addition, information markets are potentially subject to many of the 
same structural problems that are present in financial markets.  Without cor-
rection or intervention, these structural problems can result in market fail-
ure.147  The literature warns of problems with information cascades, market 
bubbles, market manipulations, and insider trading.148  Although these is-
sues raise concerns, information markets can be designed to overcome these 
obstacles.  
One of the concerns about information markets is the worry that traders 
in the market will arrive at an incorrect prediction due to an “information 
cascade.”149  In an information cascade, members of the group receive in-
formation at different times.  Unfortunately, the first members to receive the 
information fixate on an incorrect assumption or fact, and then everyone 
else in the group blindly follows along, adopting the erroneous informa-
tion.150  For example, before CPS assisted with polling a class for answers, 
the traditional method of the instructor asking the class for which option 
they wanted to choose by raising their hands would often lead to an infor-
mation cascade.  The students would look around the room and potentially 
change their votes if they thought they were in the minority.151  Like the in-
famous lemmings, those caught in an information cascade “follow the 
leader,” potentially blindly off a cliff.152 
 
146  Ajit Kambil, You Can Bet on Idea Markets, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Dec. 1, 
2003, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml?id=3808&t=innovation. 
147  Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:  An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 
J. CORP. L. 635, 662 (2003). 
148  See infra notes 152–160 and accompanying text. 
149  Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:  Deliberations, Statistical Means, and Information Markets 
25–26 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper No. 04-17, 2004) [hereinafter Sun-
stein, Group Judgments]. 
150  See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:  On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 
1254–56 (2001) (examining trends in legal scholarship and analyzing why certain movements gain or 
lose popularity within the legal academy); see also id. at 1252 n.4 (citing, for example, Lisa Anderson & 
Charles Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1997); Sushil Bikchan-
dani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. 
POL. ECON. 992 (1992)). 
151  See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text for the discussion of CPS. 
152  DENNIS CHITTY, DO LEMMINGS COMMIT SUICIDE?:  BEAUTIFUL HYPOTHESES AND UGLY FACTS 
(1996). 
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A related problem is that of “groupthink,” where those within a group 
all begin to think alike.153  This phenomenon is typically the result of either 
peer pressure or a hierarchy that coerces everyone in the group to conform.  
Rather than value cognitive diversity, in this instance, groups function to 
stifle dissent and diversity of opinion.  Many have blamed the recent explo-
sion of corporate corruption and fraud on the presence of group-
think⎯following the instructions of corporate leaders to “make the 
numbers” even when those instructions are known to be wrong or fraudu-
lent.154   
Another problem present in financial markets is the “bubble” phe-
nomenon.  From the inflated tulip prices in seventeenth-century Holland to 
the Internet boom and bust in the late 1990s, markets are subject to periods 
where stock prices far outpace the value of the underlying asset.155  The 
Internet boom of the 1990s led to speculation in technology companies, 
companies that had no profits and no concrete plan for generating reve-
nue.156  In part, this is because stocks, at least in the short term, are not 
pegged to objective measures, but are valued by what the next buyer will 
pay.157   
Our model is designed to overcome these potential problems.  One way 
to avoid information cascades, groupthink, and market bubbles is to pre-
serve the diversity and independence of individuals within the group.  Hav-
ing each person trade independently of others reduces the herding and 
groupthink instincts and insulates the market from information cascades.158  
As each trader has her own financial incentive to make correct predictions, 
groupthink should be moderated by the market.  And, if Tiresias does not 
involve tradable securities, bubbles would be unlikely because individuals 
 
153  Commentators have analyzed the role of “peer pressure,” “groupthink,” and “corruption of 
judgment” in response to the pressure to conform socially.  Of interest are the classic experiments car-
ried out by Stanley Milgram, in which subjects agonized about, but then finally agreed, to administer 
electric shocks to another subject.  See Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and the Perfect Storm, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1388–89 (2003) (describing the Milgram experiments and arguing that similar 
groupthink phenomenon led to the crisis at, and the ultimate failure of, Enron).   
154  James A. Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director:  Countering Corporate Inner Circles 
(George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 83, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=471261.  
155  Stout, supra note 147, at 662. 
156  See Christopher Oster, Sudden Impact for Bond Funds, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2003, at C1 (de-
scribing Internet bubble); Scott Thurm, Tech Jobs Start to Come back in U.S. After Three-year Slump, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56927622 (describing Internet bubble, 
resulting devastation in technology sector, and ongoing recovery). 
157  Stout, supra note 147, at 636 (arguing that flaws of efficient market hypothesis lie in assump-
tions of homogeneous investor expectations, rationality on part of investors, and the availability of arbi-
trage).  As Stout states, the “idea that securities prices reflect informed estimates of value has always 
coexisted uneasily with a darker view that sees stock prices as disconnected from economic reality.”  Id. 
158  Of course, this is not to say that participants might not be swayed by information reported in the 
media or elsewhere, but as experts familiar with the Court and making independent judgments, one as-
sumes that they will be able to place information in context. 
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would not see the predictions of other participants until after they had al-
ready voted. 
Insider trading is another concern with traditional financial markets 
that could also be raised about information markets.159  The criminalization 
of insider trading arose because of concerns over fundamental fairness as 
well as the idea that trading on inside information had resulted in corporate 
corruption without any real benefits to stockholders.160  While there is some 
debate among academics about the logic of removing insider trading sanc-
tions,161 it does not appear that anyone seriously thinks insider trading laws 
will be removed, especially in the wake of the extensive corporate corrup-
tion exposed in the WorldCom and Enron financial scandals.162   
There is no doubt, however, that the information insiders hold is valu-
able.  In fact, its value is the major reason that insiders are banned from 
trading on such inside information in traditional markets.  Are the same 
concerns that prevent insider trading on the capital markets a problem in the 
context of information markets?  In one sense, the answer is no, because in-
side information would tend to make the predictions and the market overall 
more accurate, and any individual unjust enrichment is arguably out-
weighed by the increased accuracy of the markets.  But, of course, this un-
just enrichment remains morally objectionable, and, practically, if there is 
the perception that some insiders have managed to rig the market, that per-
ception may drive away other valuable participants.  
With Tiresias this problem is minimized because the only truly “in-
side” information would come from the Justices themselves, current Su-
preme Court law clerks, staff attorneys, or other Supreme Court personnel.  
All of these individuals have duties of confidentiality and appear to adhere 
to those duties.163  So the problem in this context is minimal, and there is a 
prohibition against leaking information already in place.  Given these cir-
cumstances, insider trading will not create a major obstacle for Tiresias.164   
 
159  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).  
160  Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regula-
tion, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2002).  
161  Ian Ayres & Stephan Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 319–20 
(2002). 
162  See, e.g., John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud and Securities Reform:  An Enron Prosecutor’s Per-
spective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57 (2005). 
163  See Note, The Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1981).  The Judi-
cial Conference of the United States adopted a Code of Conduct for Law Clerks in 1981.  See J. Daniel 
Mahoney, Law Clerks:  For Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 329 n.43 (1988). 
164  Former Supreme Court law clerks may have some information not publicly available because of 
their close interactions with the Justices for whom they worked, but as long as that former clerk is not 
currently receiving any information about pending cases, that does not present a problem.  Any further 
confidentiality issues are avoided, as traders are merely registering their vote, not offering detailed ex-
planations of how they reached their conclusion.  Thus, the information from former clerks can be as-
similated into Tiresias, with no need for potentially embarrassing revelations.  See EDWARD LAZARUS, 
CLOSED CHAMBERS:  THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT (1999) (detailing 
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A final concern common to stock markets and information markets is 
the worry that an individual, or a set of individuals, will seek to manipulate 
the market for profit.165  In the context of information markets, this worry is 
compounded because, in addition to potential profiteering, individuals face 
moral hazard in that they may have strong preferences for a particular out-
come.  In markets with tradable securities and a financial payout, the market 
itself often thwarts attempts at manipulation.  Arbitrageurs, perceiving that 
the market has become out of balance, will sense an opportunity for 
profit.166  Upon their entry, the price of the securities readjusts to reflect, 
once again, the accurate price.  Yet this reaction may not be entirely suffi-
cient to prevent manipulation, as various past efforts at manipulation sug-
gest.167  In an information market without tradable securities or direct 
financial payouts, the issue is even more challenging.  Discussed below in 
Part III are some ways that the Tiresias model is designed to address this is-
sue.168   
III. DESIGNING A SUPREME COURT INFORMATION MARKET 
As discussed above, information markets have proved accurate in 
many other contexts,169 and good reasons exist to believe that they also will 
prove successful with Supreme Court predictions.170  Yet achieving that 
success will require an effective design of the information market.171  This 
Part addresses that issue.  It begins with a brief discussion of the most com-
mon market design—one involving tradable securities with cash value and 
open access to all interested participants—and then explores potential alter-
native designs that could reduce the transaction costs that accompany par-
ticipation in traditional financial markets.  It concludes by discussing the 
possibility of offering several possible markets to participants, so that 
Tiresias can provide empirical data on the accuracy of various models of in-
formation markets.   
                                                                                                                           
controversial revelations about the Supreme Court revealed by a former clerk); Tony Mauro, Clerk Tells 
Tales out of Court, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at 7 (describing controversy).   
165  Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets 4–5 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/foulplay.pdf [hereinafter Hanson, Foul Play]; see also Kevin Dono-
van & Andrew Bary, Treasury’s 30-Year Issue Surges as Dealers Sell Short-Term Securities to Buy 
Long-Term Bonds, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1991, at C19, available at 1991 WL-WSJ 606174 (describing 
Soros’s speculations). 
166  See Langevoort, supra note 40 (defining arbitrage). 
167  See supra note 162 and accompanying text.   
168  In cases that deal with controversial subjects, it might take further policing of the market to en-
sure that activists on either side of the issue do not vote opportunistically to influence Tiresias.  We dis-
cuss this issue in greater detail infra Part III. 
169  See supra Part II.A. 
170  See supra Part II.B. 
171  See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 14, at 17 (“The success of prediction markets, like any 
market, can depend upon their design and implementation.”). 
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A. Open Markets 
The most common form of information market adopts the characteris-
tics of financial markets such as the New York Stock Exchange.  Securities 
are tradable among participants, have cash value, and can be purchased eas-
ily by almost any interested party.  As discussed above, the IEM shares 
these characteristics, and the general IEM structure could be transferable to 
a market in Supreme Court predictions.172  Participants would purchase a 
security that would pay out if the result is achieved (in this market, that the 
Supreme Court votes to affirm or reverse a certain ruling on appeal).  Secu-
rities would be tradable, including short sales, and anyone wishing to pay 
could participate.  This model offers the advantages of cash incentives, the 
possibilities of more sophisticated trading such as short sales, and its gen-
eral familiarity because of its similarity to the stock market.  It also pro-
vides the opportunity for knowledgeable participants to profit at the 
expense of less informed or politically biased participants, a method that 
has proved to be successful with the IEM. 
Yet using tradable securities with financial payouts creates transaction 
costs.  Although probably not subject to regulatory demands,173 monetary 
securities still entail establishing accounts to hold money received, arrang-
ing a trading mechanism, distributing the gains to successful participants, 
and generally managing cash flow.  Such activities are necessary when the 
primary goal of the market is to raise capital, and if Tiresias were managed 
by full-time staff, it might be possible to accomplish all these tasks.  But 
unlike the New York Stock Exchange, the goal of Tiresias is not to raise 
capital but rather to provide accurate Supreme Court predictions.  To ac-
complish that latter task, it might be better, at least initially, to attempt a 
simpler undertaking, without the financial transaction costs, that will allow 
a quick and easy test of information markets in the context of Supreme 
Court predictions. 
An intriguing idea would be the use of “virtual money” in conjunction 
with tradable securities, as some other information markets like the HSX 
have employed.174  This would obviate the need for financial accounting 
systems while still providing an easy method to score a participant’s suc-
cess.  More important, it would also allow for more sophisticated financial 
techniques such as short-selling.  It might be possible to obtain many of the 
advantages of the stock markets without involving actual money. 
 
172  This is how many existing information markets, such as the IEM, work.  See supra notes 35–41 
and accompanying text for a more detailed description of how tradable securities work in an information 
market. 
173  The IEM received a “no action” letter from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission that 
frees it from regulatory compliance.  See Iowa Electronic Markets⎯Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html#Legal (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).  Once information markets 
have gained wide acceptance, the analysis of proper regulatory measures, if any, will be an interesting 
intellectual subject, but it is currently beyond the scope of this Article. 
174  See generally Balkin, supra note 43, at 2070. 
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More fundamentally, it seems intellectually worthwhile to examine 
whether information markets are best structured in the same manner as fi-
nancial markets like the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ.  The 
goal of an information market is not to raise capital, but rather to aggregate 
information from knowledgeable participants.  It may be that alternative 
market designs that employ experts and provide incentives differently than 
do tradable securities will generate accurate results, as well.  At the very 
least, such a possibility is worth exploring, and we present one such alterna-
tive design below. 
B. Expert Markets:  Separating the Sheep from the Wolves 
The success of the information market will depend partly upon the 
knowledge of its participants.175  To produce accurate conclusions, the in-
formation market generally will require that its participants make informed 
choices—meaning that they understand the issues being addressed in the 
Supreme Court decision,176 have some rational basis for believing the Su-
preme Court will vote one way rather than another, and then honestly trade 
upon that rational belief.  Assemble such a group, and the information mar-
ket should work for the reasons discussed above.177  Lack such a group, and 
the outcome is uncertain.  If uninformed participants flock to the market in 
significant numbers, Tiresias could fall prey to some of the problems, such 
as speculative bubbles, that lead to market failure.   
Given this uncertainty, one possibility is to create some screening 
mechanism to ensure knowledgeable participants.  This is, of course, con-
trary to participation in the stock market, where even investors with little 
knowledge or capital can purchase stocks or mutual funds with small 
amounts of money.178  It also is contrary to the U.S. political model of vot-
ing, where today almost every adult citizen can participate.179  But with 
Tiresias, the goal is not to raise capital for businesses, an objective helped 
 
175  See, e.g., Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 149, at 9 (“Suppose that people are asked not 
about the number of jelly beans in a jar, but about the number of atoms in a jelly bean.  On that question, 
people’s answers are hopelessly ill-informed, and there is no reason at all to trust their judgments.”). 
176  If participants were ignorant of the issues before the Supreme Court, there is no reason to expect 
that their answers would be accurate.  Zero plus zero is still zero.  See id. at 9–10 (discussing how law-
school faculty were “wildly inaccurate” in answering the weight, in pounds, of the fuel that powers 
space shuttles). 
177  See supra Part II.B (discussing reasons why an information market is likely to succeed in pre-
dicting Supreme Court decisions). 
178  See, e.g., WILLIAM BERNSTEIN, THE FOUR PILLARS OF INVESTING 272–74 (2002) (discussing 
how even a small investor can build a diversified portfolio).  Investments in certain hedge funds and 
other securities are limited to accredited investors, those investors who either have significant investing 
knowledge or enough in assets to bear riskier investments.   
179  Over time, of course, suffrage was extended from white males to males of all races, then to 
women, and then to those over eighteen.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. 
XXVI, § 1.  
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by a broad base of investors,180 or to obtain the consent of the governed, a 
common rationale for universal suffrage with roots in the political theory 
embedded in the Declaration of Independence.181  Rather, the goal is solely 
to obtain accurate Supreme Court predictions, and in attempting to achieve 
success in this experimental endeavor, it seems reasonable to prefer partici-
pants with more knowledge rather than less.182 
In addressing the issue of the informed participants, Professor Robin 
Hanson has distinguished between knowledgeable participants in an infor-
mation market—which he called “wolves”—and naive participants, which 
he called “sheep.”183  One approach, adopted by traditional financial mar-
kets and information markets like the IEM, is to allow wolves to eat sheep, 
that is, profit by exploiting the mistakes made by uninformed traders.  But 
less carnivorous options might also succeed in producing accurate predic-
tions, and if one wished to separate the groups in an information market, so 
that only the most knowledgeable can participate, the practical question is 
how to go about doing so.184 
1. Calling All Wolves.—Perhaps the obvious first step is to invite ex-
perts to participate.  Among the desired participants are the law professors 
(and law students) who read articles like this one.  Legal scholars follow 
Court decisions as part of their livelihood, have first-rate legal educations, 
frequently have worked as appellate clerks,185 and ideally should have the 
emotional discipline to distinguish between the decisions they would prefer 
and the decisions that the Supreme Court provides.  Even if only 50 to 100 
 
180  See supra note 16. 
181  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that a government’s just 
powers derived “from the consent of the governed”). 
182  On screening out the ill-informed, compare Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:  A 
Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000) (distinguishing between types of investors based 
on their relative informational resourcefulness to prescribe varying levels of regulatory protection). 
183  See Noam Scheiber, 2003:  The 3rd Annual Year in Ideas; Futures Markets in Everything, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 68.  Professor Hanson uses the terms to distinguish between 
naive participants and those who base decisions on hard evidence.  For this context, we add to this the 
additional requirements of honestly voting a rational belief.  Thus, in our usage, “sheep” include not 
only uninformed participants but those who attempt to manipulate the information market by voting for 
their favored position regardless of their objective belief of its likelihood of success. 
184  The screening, in addition to screening out good-faith sheep, also may help to limit abuses.  See 
Hanson, Foul Play, supra note 165, at 3.  (“[W]e might hope to limit foul play in any social institution 
by limiting who can participate in that institution.”). 
185  See, e.g., Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession:  An Empirical 
Profile of the Nation’s Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191 (1991) (describing credentials of 
law professors); Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?”:  Gatekeeping for the Pro-
fessoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 595 (2003) (“Law profes-
sors are among the most elite in the law, an already elite profession.”). 
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law professors participate by voting on an entire Court Term, it might be 
enough to establish an accurate information market.186 
Nevertheless, compelling reasons exist to extend the potential voting 
pool beyond the academy.  Limiting participation to professors would ex-
clude a great many knowledgeable observers, including practitioners who 
practice Supreme Court advocacy for a living.187  It also would exclude 
scholars at public interest groups who follow the Supreme Court at least as 
closely as the average law professor.188  Such Court specialists, which in-
clude former solicitor generals, belong on anyone’s list of “wolves.”  Like-
wise, the Supreme Court press corps tracks the Justices closely, speaks with 
a variety of experts, and frequently has off-the-record knowledge that could 
inform predictions.189  
Increasing diversity by inviting knowledgeable Court observers to par-
ticipate will likely lead to more accurate predictions.190  Any small group 
will have a limited range of experiences, and to the extent it communicates 
principally among itself on a given topic, the risk of “groupthink” develops 
that may mislead predictions.191  Bringing additional observers into the 
group, especially those with different backgrounds or ideological perspec-
tives, should reduce this risk.  This is particularly true if the pool of law 
professors is likely to have different ideological beliefs than those of the 
majority of a court with numerous Republican appointments.192  Thus, it 
 
186  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 28 (indicating that an information market may be able to function 
successfully with as few as forty members). 
187  Supreme Court advocacy is a highly skilled art, and its practitioners are among the finest in the 
profession.  See generally KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR:  LEGAL ELITES IN THE 
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993). 
188  Ruth Bader Ginsburg worked as counsel for Women’s Rights Project of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union before her appointment to the Supreme Court.  See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 
106 (2005) (discussing Ginsburg’s advocacy work).  Surely at that time Ginsburg should have qualified 
to participate, as would current members of advocacy groups such as Clint Bolick of the Institute for 
Justice or Roger Pilon and Robert Levy of the Cato Institute. 
189  See Greenhouse, supra note 57, at 782 (describing predictions that journalists make on routine 
basis, and her own published predictions, which were correct seventy-five percent of the time).   
190  Once Tiresias is operational, this hypothesis could be tested empirically.  As discussed below, 
registration with Tiresias would be by e-mail address, and by distinguishing between addresses ending 
in “.edu” and addresses ending in “.com” or “.org,” it would be possible to assemble data for future arti-
cles about whether, in predicting Supreme Court outcomes, academic observers are better, worse, or 
equivalent to those outside of universities. 
191  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 28, at 36–39 (discussing risk of groupthink and benefits of cogni-
tive diversity).  This sort of phenomenon also has been dubbed the “firehouse effect,” after a claim that 
fire fighters “with much downtime who talk to each other for too long come to agree on many things 
that an outside, impartial observer would find ludicrous;” NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY 
RANDOMNESS 82 (2d ed. 2004) (describing firehouse effect).   
192  In a recent Georgetown Law Journal article, Professor John McGinnis examines political dona-
tions as proxy for political beliefs, and he concludes that law faculties are more liberal than the general 
public.  John O. McGinnis, Matthew A. Schwartz & Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and Implications of 
Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167 (2005).  Given that Tiresias will 
offer incentives for correct predictions, participants will have reasons to vote their honest predictions 
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might be particularly helpful to have the insights of those who share the 
worldview not only of Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
but also of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.  In other words, 
to be most effective, a potential Supreme Court information market needs 
Theodore Olson as much as Laurence Tribe.  In addition, the cognitive di-
versity from allowing the participation of knowledgeable nonattorneys 
would help the more systematic biases created in the minds of those who 
have undergone legal training and “think like lawyers.”  To the extent that 
the Court is result oriented, a lawyer’s focus on precedent sometimes may 
be a burden,193 so the contributions of knowledgeable nonattorneys, such as 
scholars in political science, may bring valuable insights.194 
2. What’s in It for Me?:  Incentives for Participation.—Why would 
knowledgeable participants agree to participate?  An information market 
similar to the IEM would provide direct financial incentives through trad-
able securities, but because of the associated transaction costs, it seems 
worthwhile to consider possible alternatives in the expert market.  A choice 
to forgo tradable securities requires, of course, that a suitable pool of ex-
perts will still be attracted to participate.195  On this question, prior experi-
                                                                                                                           
rather than their political preferences, and we have reason to believe that professors will be able to ap-
preciate this distinction.  Indeed, the willingness to separate normative and positive judgments is a pri-
mary distinction between wolves and sheep. 
193  For example, even defenders of affirmative action might acknowledge that knowing the plain 
language of Title VII would have proved misleading in predicting the decision in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), to allow employment preferences for racial minorities.  By the 
same token, even some conservatives might acknowledge that a detailed knowledge of the Court’s prior 
equal protection jurisprudence might have been less than decisive in predicting the outcome of Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  Without taking positions on the merits of either of these decisions here, we 
merely submit that if a Court wants to reach a certain political result, nonattorney political observers are 
just as capable of predicting this outcome as are constitutional scholars. 
194  The mechanics of reaching these various kinds of experts should not be difficult given the exis-
tence of so many wolf lairs.  Professors have websites for posting scholarly works in progress, see So-
cial Science Research Network, http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2006), and a number of 
prominent law professors have created popular web logs.  See, for example, Professor Lawrence 
Solum’s blog on legal theory, Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.blogspot.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 
2006); Professor Eugene Volokh’s blog, Volokh Conspiracy, www.http://volokh.com/ (last visited Mar. 
3, 2006); Professor Jack Balkin’s blog, Balkanization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 
2006); and Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).  A 
briefing circuit for the Supreme Court press corps regarding the upcoming Court Term poses another 
easy way to reach these specialists, as do constitutional law blogs devoted to appellate courts.  Among 
the leading appellate blogs (by practitioners) likely to be visited by knowledgeable Court watchers are 
the Supreme Court blog at Goldstein Howe, SCOTUSblog, www.goldsteinhowe.com/blog/index.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2006), and Howard J. Bashman’s blog on appellate advocacy, How Appealing, 
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).  Inviting experts to participate in Tiresias 
will thus be relatively straightforward. 
195  Robert W. Hahn has noted that participants in information markets without real currency “may 
not have a strong incentive to acquire costly information about fundamental values.”  See Hahn, supra 
note 139, at 8.  This should not be a problem with Tiresias because most participants (such as journalists 
and practitioners) will have an incentive to acquire the information in the course of their jobs, and aca-
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ence is not conclusive,196 but it is encouraging, particularly the relative 
popularity of recreational contests197 including play-money exchanges and 
the sports gambling industry.  These exchanges suggest the possibility of 
adequate motivation “through the thrill of pitting one’s judgment against 
others,” as Wolfers and Zitzewitz have noted.198   
The burden to vote will be minimal, perhaps a few minutes to log onto 
a website and click on a prediction.  This expenditure will be more than re-
warded, however, as the minor costs to each participant are transformed 
into a major benefit to be redistributed among those who participate.  As 
discussed more fully below, knowledge of the outcome of the information 
market could be available only to those who first cast their ballot.  Casting 
one’s ballot would allow access to the collective wisdom on the subject, 
whereas hoarding one’s prediction would deprive one of access to what is 
likely to be an accurate predictive tool.199  For a professor teaching about a 
pending Court case, a journalist writing an analysis, or a lawyer wondering 
how an issue will be decided, the benefits from learning the prediction of 
the informed legal community are almost certainly greater than the minor 
cost of casting one’s vote.200  Tiresias predictions also can have monetary 
value, as discussed more fully below.201 
Participation also offers the possibility of public recognition for savvy 
Court predictors. Who makes the most intelligent, accurate predictions?  
Tiresias will let the legal community know if there are Warren Buffetts of 
Supreme Court predictions.  Although some participants may want ano-
nymity (a desire that would be honored),202 other professors or practitioners 
who thrive on competition will want acknowledgment as being among the 
                                                                                                                           
demic participants (along with others) are likely to be motivated to make accurate predictions to display 
their insights into the Supreme Court. 
196  Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 14, at 18 (noting that there is not sufficient comparative data to 
know the extent to which money makes predictions more accurate). 
197  Of most direct relevance, the amusement site Lawpsided, www.lawpsided.com (last visited Mar. 
3, 2006), ran a contest about predicting Supreme Court outcomes that attracted a number of participants.  
See supra note 111. 
198  Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 14, at 19.  The authors in context are speaking about trading 
and believe that motivation to trade is necessary.  Tiresias may involve voting, not trading securities, but 
we think their point about motivation arising from pitting one’s judgment against others’ may apply in 
this context as well, particularly when combined with the other incentives we discuss. 
199  See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing why a Supreme Court information market is likely to accu-
rately predict outcome of Court decisions). 
200  In fact, many such Court observers share their predictions informally when questioned by other 
Court observers.  Tiresias takes this informal information exchange and translates it into a “water 
cooler” in cyberspace where the discussion can involve a much larger group of knowledgeable partici-
pants and provide greater feedback.  We suspect that most Court observers would be interested in know-
ing if their fellows have reached the same conclusion about a case or if one’s views are in the minority. 
201  See infra notes 243–248 and accompanying text (discussing how accurate predictions of Court 
rulings can have monetary value in settlement discussions and in advising clients). 
202  Issues of anonymous voting are discussed more fully below.  See infra notes 229–230 and ac-
companying text. 
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best in the field.  For professors, these reputational interests are valuable, 
and for practitioners, the recognition can lead to additional clients, increases 
in billable hours, higher billing rates, and more opportunities to analyze and 
argue Supreme Court cases.  
More idealistically, participation in Tiresias involves the sharing of 
knowledge—perhaps the sine qua non of the academic community—and an 
opportunity for lawyers and other knowledgeable observers to replace un-
certainty about the Court with more accurate predictions.  Tiresias will give 
the legal community an opportunity to learn in advance what rulings the 
Supreme Court will hand down, just as the original ancient prophet could 
warn in advance about the decisions of the gods on Mt. Olympus.  Such 
knowledge would be important, and helping to produce it seems worth a 
few moments of one’s time.  When that is combined with a desire to learn 
the predictions and with the reputational interests of successful predictions, 
these alternatives offer ample incentives for experts to participate.203   
3. Designing a Screen, and the Control Group in the Sheep Pen.—If 
“wolves” are to be enticed to vote, “sheep” may pose a different problem.  
As other observers have recognized, these participants, whether through ig-
norance or scheming, may reduce the accuracy of the information market.204  
Perhaps the most obvious example of “sheep” behavior is those wishing to 
vote to express a belief on how the Court normatively should rule, not a de-
scriptive prediction on how it actually will.  Thus, antiabortion activists may 
try to use Tiresias to vote in favor of a particular form of abortion restric-
tion, regardless of whether the Court is likely to uphold it.205  Likewise, gay-
rights activists may attempt to sway the outcome of Tiresias voting on an 
issue such as gay marriage to attempt to portray public support for their 
cause.206  And, as discussed above, political bias is not necessary to cause 
problems; mere ignorance may be enough to reduce Tiresias’s accuracy.207 
These concerns may be unfounded, of course.  Even with a number of 
ill-informed participants, Tiresias still might produce accurate predictions.  
One of the advantages of information markets is their ability to transmute 
 
203  If these incentives nonetheless fail, an alternative would be to provide some form of subsidy to 
encourage participation.   
204  See, e.g., Hanson, Foul Play, supra note 165, at 4 (“Another possible form of foul play is where 
participants who want to influence policy decisions directly distort their contributions to the institution 
forecasts.”). 
205  A prime example of an opportunity for such mischief in an information market would have been 
the prediction in Stenberg v. Carhart, where the Court protected a controversial method of abortion (so-
called partial-birth abortions), despite passionate opposition from the antiabortion community.  530 U.S. 
914 (2000). 
206  A prime example would be if the Court addresses issues involving gay marriage, possibly by re-
viewing a statute such as the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 2004), which attempts to al-
low states to deny recognition of gay marriages created in other states.   
207  See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 149, at 9–10 (discussing how law school faculty 
were “wildly inaccurate” in answering the weight, in pounds, of the fuel that powers space shuttles). 
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individuals’ limitations into collective wisdom.208  Yet given this uncer-
tainty about how uninformed or partisan participants will affect the out-
comes, one possibility, at least initially, is to adopt measures that try to limit 
the voting to knowledgeable and objective participants.209 
How might an information market separate the “sheep” from the 
“wolves”?  Several overarching approaches exist for accomplishing this 
function, each with certain advantages and drawbacks.  We will describe 
them below for the sake of others designing information markets and pro-
vide an initial assessment of their application for Tiresias.  Ultimately, 
however, the final decision of which screening mechanisms to use will be 
determined later when Tiresias becomes operational, not in the presentation 
of the idea of a Supreme Court information market in this Article.   
One approach is to allow access to the information market only if a 
human gatekeeper—one of Tiresias’s “priests” or “priestesses”—concludes 
that an applicant has sufficient knowledge to participate and will act in 
good faith to vote their honest predictions.  The gatekeeper would approve 
participants who have indicia of expertise—such as law degrees, occupa-
tions involving the study of the Supreme Court, and so forth—while ex-
cluding those who might seem likely to attempt to taint the Tiresias vote:  
apparent political partisans, as the most likely culprits.210  This method has 
the advantage of being simple to implement, and it also would provide the 
greatest protection against a flock of sheep trampling over Tiresias. 
This gatekeeper solution has several significant disadvantages, how-
ever.  First, the screening process ultimately might be a significant burden 
on the gatekeeper, particularly if large numbers of people started to partici-
pate (as might occur after the publicity surrounding any predictive suc-
cesses), and the gatekeeper would have the thankless task of rejecting 
applicants for what may appear to be subjective reasons.  Second, and more 
important, every increase in transaction costs, such as requiring approval by 
a gatekeeper, will likely decrease participation.211  To maximize the size of 
the desired voting pool, participation should be as convenient as possible, 
and one way to accomplish that is to allow participants to register in min-
utes and then proceed directly to vote.  If the process becomes more oner-
ous, Tiresias risks a decrease in expert participation. 
 
208  See generally supra Part I.A.   
209  As discussed below, once Tiresias is operational, it will be possible to obtain empirical evidence 
about whether sheep in fact vote less accurately than wolves.  If sheep prove as accurate at predictions, it 
would be possible to remove the screening mechanisms and have an unrestricted information market 
where anyone could vote. 
210  See Hanson, Foul Play, supra note 165, at 3 (“[W]e might hope to limit foul play in any social 
institution by limiting who can participate in that institution.”). 
211  Transaction costs, often given a context-specific definition, are essentially the expenditure of re-
sources and effort necessary to complete an action.  See generally Ronald Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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A second approach might be to have basic, objective eligibility re-
quirements, which would reduce subjective assessments by the gatekeeper.  
It would be possible to allow all members of state bar associations or stu-
dents at accredited law schools to vote by registering their bar membership 
number or student identification number, for example, or to include all 
journalists with a recognized media organization.  This approach results in a 
broader pool of participants, with less screening for indicators of expertise, 
but it still should provide an initial screen to obtain knowledgeable partici-
pants.  The screen should be relatively easy to enforce against cheating if 
necessary.  In the case of attorneys, Martindale Hubbell listings,212 com-
bined with state bar records, provide an easy way to prevent individuals 
who falsely claim to be lawyers from participating, and such persons could 
be excluded once the fraud is uncovered.  Likewise, if a Westlaw, Lexis, or 
Web search could not confirm that a registrant is a working journalist or 
Supreme Court scholar, then a phone call to the individual’s organization 
could be used to obtain additional information and verify credentials.   
In sum, under this second approach of listing participation criteria, the 
role of the gatekeeper is that of preventing fraudulent participation, which 
should be a less onerous task than making affirmative decisions on whether 
to admit or deny every request for participation.  Participation remains con-
venient, and the administrative burden is reduced.  The disadvantage of this 
second approach is that, as with many formal criteria, it can be both under-
inclusive and overinclusive.  Knowledgeable participants, true wolves, 
might be excluded because they did not possess one of the general require-
ments (such as a law degree or a job involving study of the Supreme Court), 
whereas someone with a law degree still might wish to vote for partisan 
reasons and thus be a “sheep” despite meeting the formal qualification.   
A third screening approach would not use a human gatekeeper but in-
stead would employ a test—a subtle sort of obstacle course—by which par-
ticipants would sort themselves either into the wolf den or the sheep pen.  
The goal is a form of self-authorizing access where those able to reach the 
oracle thereby prove their eligibility to vote.  
In designing this screening process, a first simple step might be to ask 
registrants (shrewdly) about their goals.  When an individual first registers 
to vote, the Tiresias program could offer two options.   
 
Option A:  Supreme Court opinion poll.  I want to express my views on 
how the Supreme Court should decide particular cases.  Let me vote! 
 
Option B:  Nonpartisan contributions to academic research project on 
information markets.   
 
212  Such listings are available online at Lawyer Locator, http://www.martindale.com (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2006). 
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The computer system would record which option the registrant chose 
and bind the participant to that initial choice⎯no switching one’s path, in 
other words.  Those registrants who choose the dull-sounding Option B 
would be sent to Tiresias to vote.  Those participants who choose the spicy-
sounding Option A would be given what they want⎯a chance to express 
their opinions about what the Court should do.  They would have the same 
selection menu about the Supreme Court’s pending docket, and they could 
vote their political desires.  Their votes would not count toward the Tiresias 
predictions, however.  In essence, the sheep will be given a sheep pen in 
which they can play amongst themselves, while the wolves conduct their 
business elsewhere.213 
These three approaches—subjective human gatekeeper, rule-based 
standards, and self-authorizing access—provide broad ways to think about 
the screening problem in designing information markets, but in practice, it 
may be most effective to adopt a hybrid approach.  Tiresias may list qualifi-
cations for participation (including a general catch-all provision for knowl-
edgeable participants who might not possess standard indicia such as a law 
degree), a sheep trap might still route naïve participants into the sheep pen, 
and a human gatekeeper could monitor to prevent abuses. 
In setting up this screening process, we do not mean to be unduly de-
meaning toward those participants who Professor Hanson has dubbed 
“sheep.”214  These partisan participants still would have an opportunity to 
vote and satisfy their desire to express their political views on how the Su-
preme Court should decide a particular case.  They merely would be pre-
vented from tainting the outcome of a predictive process in which they are 
not truly interested.  Yet if somehow a “sheep” proved especially successful 
at predictions (a wolf in sheep’s clothing), that individual could be trans-
ferred into the wolf den to participate in the Tiresias voting pool.215  
Moreover, sheep votes would not be ignored.  In addition to allowing 
self-expression for the participants, sheep votes would serve the important 
function of providing an on-going control group to be compared with the 
 
213  Other screening options are available.  As one possibility, the Tiresias voting could be made less 
than user friendly in some aspects.  For example, the Supreme Court cases may be identified only by 
name, without any identification of the issues involved, or even only by docket number.  The user could 
be offered an option to obtain more information about the issues involved, an option that would then sur-
reptitiously transfer the individual into a more user friendly sheep pen with additional information about 
the issues.  Alternatively, users could be required to vote in blocks.  That is, participants would need to 
vote on a series of routine cases before being able to vote on a politically charged one.  Each of these 
methods has significant disadvantages, but, while not ideal solutions, they do illustrate the range of crea-
tive solutions for accomplishing screening goals.  
214  See generally supra note 183 (identifying the use of “sheep” and “wolves” in discussing infor-
mation market participants). 
215  Conversely, a “wolf” who proved especially bad at Supreme Court predictions could be dis-
cretely transferred into the sheep pen without causing any embarrassment. 
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expert participants.  It would be significant if the sheep predictions proved 
as accurate as the wolf predictions, either overall or even on particular cases 
or issues.  Such a result would suggest either that (1) Tiresias’s separation 
between sheep and wolves was ineffective and might need to be abandoned, 
or (2) specialized knowledge is not particularly helpful in predicting Su-
preme Court outcomes.216   
Are these methods of screening sheep from wolves foolproof?  Of 
course not.  An individual might fool a human gatekeeper in obtaining ac-
cess, and it is possible that an organized advocacy group could tell its 
members how to bypass any sheep traps and vote solely to try to bias the 
Tiresias prediction.217  Were that to occur, Tiresias’s priests and priestesses 
might exclude or otherwise discount the votes of those who showed up only 
one time to trade on a particularly partisan issue.  If necessary, new partici-
pants (and their trades) in a particular case could be transferred en masse 
into the sheep pen to maintain the integrity of the established Tiresias vot-
ing pool.218  We envision the administration of Tiresias to be adaptable and 
dynamic⎯able to monitor the voting process, analyze new challenges, and 
adjust the system to preserve the goals of the information market. 
In the end, however, Tiresias, like many collaborative efforts, may re-
quire the good faith of its participants to succeed.  We hope this will not 
prove to be a problem, but the operation of Tiresias will provide empirical 
data to test that hypothesis. 
4. Issues of Implementing an Expert Market.—The actual mechanics 
of participating in Tiresias need not be complicated.  Perhaps the easiest so-
lution would be to establish a Tiresias website, funded by a grant, univer-
sity, law firm, or media organization.  Participants would register via an e-
mail address219 and select a password, a common practice for registration on 
many websites.  In its cyber-voting-booth, Tiresias would list all the cases 
in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.220  Upon clicking on a 
 
216  We would be surprised at this latter outcome.  We fully expect law professors and Supreme 
Court practitioners to make better predictions than political partisans.  Yet this hypothesis should be 
tested empirically; once sufficient data are accumulated, the results may lead to a change in screening 
procedures, if not their outright abolition.  If nothing else, the comparison between the voting accuracy 
of the sheep and wolf pools may be an interesting article for the future. 
217  Individuals have in the past attempted to manipulate information markets, largely without suc-
cess.  See, e.g., Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 14, at 16. 
218  Were this to occur, it would be desirable to preserve the identity and votes of those transferred in 
case the Tiresias administrators later appeared to have made a categorization error and incorrectly trans-
ferred the participants. 
219  Obtaining an e-mail address would allow communications with the participants if necessary, 
which seems desirable, if only to ascertain privacy preferences about public recognition (a topic dis-
cussed more fully below). 
220  Ultimately, the Tiresias voting booth could contain other useful information such as petitions for 
certiorari and their oppositions, merit briefs by the parties, or news stories describing the issues in-
volved. 
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case name or docket number, the participant would select between “affirm” 
and “reverse.”221  For simplicity, the options initially may not try to predict 
partial decisions such as “affirm in part” or “reverse in part.”222  After indi-
viduals vote, they would be allowed to see the current tally of votes for that 
particular case.  Participants would be able to return to the site to track the 
voting in a particular case or possibly even to change their vote if desired to 
reflect new information.  Trading would be cut off (retroactively, if need 
be)223 to the day before the Supreme Court released its opinion.  At the end 
of a Supreme Court Term, the most accurate predictors could be identified 
and recognized if desired on the Tiresias website. 
The possibility of public recognition for successful Tiresias predictions 
raises issues of privacy and secret balloting.  On the one hand, Tiresias 
needs to track an individual’s voting record.  Recording the fact of a previ-
ous vote is necessary to prevent double voting, and the tracking of the 
vote’s content is necessary both to evaluate the accuracy of a participant 
and to accumulate aggregated statistical data for future research.224  Yet to 
attract knowledgeable participants, it seems helpful to guarantee their pri-
vacy, and thus Tiresias should have a policy that participants’ names and 
voting records would not be disclosed without their consent.  This would 
reduce the risk of retribution against people with specialized knowledge—
for example, an attorney in the U.S. Office of the Solicitor General who 
predicts that the United States will lose a certain case or a private lawyer 
who votes against his or her client’s desired position.225   
The issue of privacy collides with the concern about “insider trading” 
by Supreme Court employees.  The concerns of unfair financial gain that 
underlie the prohibition on insider trading in the securities markets might be 
 
221  In a matter involving the Court’s original jurisdiction, the choice would be between the plaintiff 
and the defendant. 
222  In the future, it might be possible to expand the Tiresias voting options, perhaps including the 
full range of outcomes, the treatment of certain issues within a case, or even which Justices are likely to 
vote which way.  Ultimately, a secondary Tiresias market might develop in predicting grants of certio-
rari or long-term predictions about issues that the Court might be expected to address over the next dec-
ade.   
223  Tiresias would record the date and time of any individual’s vote, to assist in the scholarly re-
search on voting times described more fully below. 
224  Possibilities for future research will include the relative accuracy of various registrants from dif-
ferent organizations, e.g., businesses as opposed to universities or government institutions, and the suc-
cess of earlier voters as compared with later voters.  The ultimate goal would be to investigate if a 
profile of the “superior predictor” exists.  To our knowledge, no other information market has attempted 
this sort of analysis.  Moreover, if Tiresias ultimately were to obtain from participants basic demo-
graphic information such as age, gender, and political affiliation, it would also be possible to determine 
the relative predictive ability of men versus women, those under forty versus those over forty, and Re-
publicans versus Democrats.  To our knowledge, no other information market has sought to investigate 
such issues. 
225  Outside the context of the Supreme Court, Professor Hanson raises the risk of retribution by a 
project leader who might punish anyone on his project team who “disputed his rosy forecast.”  See Han-
son, Foul Play, supra note 165, at 9. 
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present in an IEM-type information market that used tradable securities.  
Such concerns would not be present with an information market without di-
rect financial payouts, however, and the participation of Court insiders 
might increase Tiresias’s overall accuracy.  We expect that this issue will be 
more than speculative.  As discussed below, if Tiresias attracts a substantial 
number of informed participants, the Supreme Court Justices or clerks may 
have an interest in learning the prediction of the legal community before an 
opinion is released.  Yet under one model, such predictions will not be 
available without casting of a ballot in each individual case for which a pre-
diction is sought.  Given the unique situation of Supreme Court employees, 
perhaps the most diplomatic solution is for Tiresias to provide a “judicial 
bypass” account, which would allow Court employees to learn the current 
status of the voting without having to register votes of their own.226 
One final issue of the mechanics of the information market is the tim-
ing of votes.  As mentioned above, participants will be able to enter a pre-
diction any time from the grant of certiorari to the day before the decision is 
handed down.  It will be interesting to analyze when most participants 
choose to vote.  On the one hand, even the grant of certiorari will itself say 
something to some observers, and an early vote will allow access to the 
Tiresias database before other observers.  On the other hand, delaying one’s 
vote until after the filing of briefs will provide additional information about 
the strength of the party’s arguments, and predictions entered after oral ar-
gument will have the advantages of incorporating the Justices’ reactions to 
the advocates.227  Yet waiting to vote means that the participant might not 
gain the information about the collective wisdom until closer to the issuance 
of the ruling, when the prediction may be of less use in exploiting the 
knowledge in ways such as advising clients or taking action before the 
Court rules.  Each participant will have to weigh these timing considera-
tions in deciding how much information to acquire before casting a vote.   
With this raw data about the timing of individuals’ votes, researchers 
can compare predictive accuracy against time of voting, raising additional 
issues for research and analysis.  For example, if participants who vote be-
fore the Court hears oral argument are just as accurate with their predictions 
as those who vote after argument, what might this mean about the impor-
tance of oral argument in the actual outcome?228  Or if the prediction market 
 
226  Judges and clerks on lower courts still could be required to vote to obtain the Tiresias prediction.  
Their expert participation would be valuable to Tiresias and would not risk the disclosure of confidential 
information as would a vote by someone at the Supreme Court with inside knowledge.  
227  For example, if Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said, “my goodness,” in response to an argument, 
it reportedly boded ill for that party.  See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 49 (2004) (“When she 
said ‘my goodness’ or ‘for goodness’ sakes,’ you could be pretty sure that she was signaling how she 
was going to vote.”). 
228  The value and relative weight that appellate oral argument plays in the ultimate decision of an 
appellate judge has been the subject of much debate.  See, e.g., Myron J. Bright, The Power of the Spo-
ken Word:  In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 IOWA L. REV. 35, 36 (1986) (according to Judge Bright of 
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changes noticeably after some new piece of information is introduced, the 
change might suggest that this information is material229 and potentially give 
some indication of the weight of its import.230 
C. Competing Markets 
Each of these types of information market—financial securities and 
expert participation—present certain advantages and risks.  Ultimately, 
however, Tiresias may not need to choose one model over another.  If suffi-
cient numbers of people with different objectives wish to participate in 
Tiresias, it might be possible eventually to offer markets to satisfy those 
wishing to make money through tradable securities, those experts who are 
concerned about the accuracy of Court predictions, and those who want to 
express an opinion about how the Supreme Court should decide a case.  The 
ideal solution might be to include several different areas within Tiresias to 
accumulate Court predictions in different ways.  An IEM-type market with 
tradable securities could exist for those wishing to profit directly by their 
predictions.  Simultaneously, there would be an area to aggregate expert 
opinions while a sheep pen allowed other voters to express their opinion on 
how the Court should rule. 
The advantages would go beyond accumulating Supreme Court predic-
tions through as many avenues as possible.  Comparing the results of the 
different markets would provide additional data about which participants 
and which market design is best at successfully predicting Supreme Court 
outcomes.  Any material difference in accuracy, both overall and with par-
ticular cases or issues, allows the opportunity to explore why, in that situa-
tion, one type of information market yielded better results.  Tiresias 
ultimately could test not just academic models of Supreme Court behavior 
but also designs of information markets. 
                                                                                                                           
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, oral arguments are valuable and assist judges in fram-
ing salient issues); Alex Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court⎯Not!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 186 (1997).  
In his article, Judge Kozinski commented on moot court competitions and stated that in real life “the 
brief is the principal advocacy tool, and oral argument is merely a means to clarify and emphasize points 
made therein.  Cases are seldom won—but occasionally lost—at oral argument.” Id. (citations omitted); 
see also Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument:  A Challenge to the Conventional 
Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1986) (arguing that costs of oral argument outstrip value). 
229  Then again, it is also possible that changes in voting margins may partly just reflect random 
variations in when individuals decide to vote.  It may or may not be possible to filter out this noise and 
weigh the impact of a given event in the Tiresias voting record.  At this point, we do not know, but it is 
worth investigating, especially given that currently there is no systematic way to attempt to quantify the 
effect of any given input on the outcome of a Supreme Court decision.  Years after the fact, a Justice’s 
papers may suggest that a particular brief or advocate made a difference in a decision, but more contem-
poraneous feedback through an analysis of Tiresias data seems worth pursuing. 
230  The market will allow for ex post identification of those cases that produced results contrary to 
market expectation and allow analysis of what could explain the surprising results.  We are indebted to 
Michael Abramowicz for this insight. 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF A SUPREME COURT INFORMATION MARKET 
The consequences of predicting Supreme Court decisions will be 
noteworthy.  The advance knowledge will be profitable for practitioners, 
helpful to lower court judges, and may influence Supreme Court rulings.  
Beyond the field of law, a successful Tiresias will publicize the worth of in-
formation markets, help overcome the stigma from DARPA’s proposal, 
which was vilified in the media, and generally advance the development of 
this important field. 
A. Benefit to Bar and Lower Bench 
Knowing how the Supreme Court is likely to rule in a particular case 
obviously interests parties and their counsel.  Yet for every party directly 
appearing before the Court, thousands more may be affected by the Court’s 
ruling.  For example, in the 2004 Term alone, cases with far-reaching con-
sequences included a case under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act,231 and a case determining the legality of software companies develop-
ing peer-to-peer file-sharing services.232  In the criminal context, inmates 
sentenced to death for murders committed while under age eighteen have 
had their death sentences commuted.233  And of even greater importance to 
the criminal justice system were the cases addressing the constitutionality 
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.234  And that is merely a single Court 
Term.  The impact of significant individual Supreme Court cases from other 
Terms, such as Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, Gideon v. Wainright, 
New York Times v. Sullivan, Miranda v. Arizona, Roe v. Wade, and Bush v. 
Gore, have been even greater.235 
 
231  Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
232  In December 2004, the Court granted certiorari to address allegations of contributory copyright 
infringement by sponsors of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing services, primarily used in this case for 
the online sharing of music and movies. See Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 
1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
233  On March 1, 2005, the Court struck down the imposition of the death penalty for those who 
committed crimes when they were between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.  See State ex rel. Sim-
mons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
234  The issue was argued in October 2004, and the Supreme Court issued its ruling in mid-January.  
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Although the implications of the Booker ruling are 
being analyzed at length, the Court in a split majority opinion held that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the Court rendered them essentially advisory.  
See Tony Mauro, Sentence Fragment:  A Supreme Court Decision Last Week Turned back the Clock 20 
Years on Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 1.  
235  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ruling on disputed presidential election); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to abortion in certain circumstances); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to inform suspects of certain constitutional rights before an 
interrogation); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (creating “actual malice” standard 
for libel claims involving public official); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending right to 
counsel in criminal cases); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down school segrega-
tion). 
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For all lawyers who must advise clients whose situations involve issues 
pending before the Court in other cases, the ability to suggest how the Su-
preme Court might resolve a pending issue is part of comprehensive coun-
seling, and many attorneys already may make private predictions to clients.  
Tiresias, however, would let lawyers provide these predictions not based 
solely on their individual guesses but rather on the collective judgment of a 
group of knowledgeable Supreme Court observers.  At the least, this sort of 
information ought to be desired by most major law firms to advise their cli-
ents. 
The greater monetary value of Tiresias, however, lies in litigation, par-
ticularly settlement negotiations and decisions.  In any given year, probably 
hundreds, if not thousands, of civil disputes and criminal prosecutions are 
settled that contain issues the Supreme Court may resolve that Term.  Par-
ties in these circumstances face the strategic choice of whether to settle a 
case before the Supreme Court issues its ruling—possibly against one’s in-
terest—or whether to wait for the Court to decide the matter.236  Advance 
knowledge of what that the Court might do should be valuable in deciding 
whether to settle or wait for the Court’s ruling.237   
This advance knowledge should be valuable in influencing the amount 
of any settlement.  If the Supreme Court is likely to favor one position, that 
could be factored into settlement values.238  If the Supreme Court appears 
likely to rule against plaintiffs on an issue such as loss causation, class-
action certification, or permissible amount of punitive damages, then plain-
tiffs and their attorneys logically ought to be willing to accept less than they 
otherwise might in the absence of information about the Supreme Court’s 
likely actions.239  Conversely, if a defendant faces a claim where the Su-
preme Court is likely to remove a defense, perhaps by recognizing disparate 
impact claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act240 or al-
 
236  Even when a Supreme Court ruling is applied only prospectively, the ability of parties to prolong 
or terminate litigation means that the Court ruling in many circumstances could have an effect in subse-
quent motions.  If a ruling does not apply on a motion to dismiss, for example, it might influence a mo-
tion for summary judgment or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (depending, of course, 
on the details of the lower-court litigation and the Supreme Court ruling). 
237  See Martin et al., supra note 7, at 766 (stating that outcomes play a “huge role” in decision to 
settle or initiate an appeal, and that a reliable predictive model “may benefit practicing attorneys and 
their clients”). 
238  Tiresias is particularly likely to be useful in settlement negotiations because it reduces the dan-
ger of mutual optimism—an unrealistic expectation of the likely judgment—which the economics litera-
ture identifies as a prime reason that cases fail to settle.  See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability 
of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 749–50 & n.219 (2005) (describing how mutual optimism may 
prevent settlement); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bar-
gaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993) (same). 
239  See, e.g., Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) 
(addressing issue of loss causation in securities litigation).  
240  Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 228 
(2005). 
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lowing a cause of action for retaliation under Title IX,241 then the defendant 
should weigh the costs of an early settlement, before the plaintiffs would be 
emboldened by favorable outcomes, against the significant costs of continu-
ing to litigate, such as legal fees and discovery burdens.  The information 
can be particularly important in high-dollar securities cases.242  Considerable 
numbers of securities lawsuits are filed each year, assessed by attorneys and 
corporate boards of directors, and frequently settled.  Millions of dollars are 
transferred in these cases, and the transfers are influenced at least partly by 
how the Supreme Court is likely to decide any relevant securities issues 
pending before it.  Particularly in this context, a better prediction of what 
the Court is likely to do is worth significant money to companies and plain-
tiffs’ lawyers alike.  When one considers that the Court may hear approxi-
mately one hundred cases a term, many with monetary ramifications, the 
financial value of the Tiresias predictions could be considerable. 
Beyond the financial value to the bar, Tiresias should prove helpful to 
the lower courts in providing interim guidance about how the Supreme 
Court is likely to rule.  In some cases, of course, a district court need only 
follow a controlling ruling by its appellate court until the Supreme Court re-
solves the issue.  In many other cases, however, state or district courts with 
no controlling authority either must postpone resolution of the issue until 
the Supreme Court rules or make their own best predictions about what re-
sult the Court is likely to reach.243  On complicated issues, this uncertainty 
can result in confusion and disagreement among various jurisdictions, all of 
which imposes its cost on the efficient functioning of the judicial system.  
The disarray over criminal sentencing before the Supreme Court’s ruling on 
the matter244 is a striking example of the confusion that can exist before the 
Court settles an issue,245 but to a lesser extent, the same confusion exists in 
any issue on which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and upon 
which a trial or appellate court has no controlling legal authority to fol-
 
241  Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 544 U.S. 167 
(2005).  
242  See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
243  Alternatively, a lower court could just adopt the position it deems most sensible, rather than try 
to predict the Supreme Court outcome, though that would risk subsequent embarrassment for the lower 
court if the Supreme Court later rejected the judge’s adopted solution. 
244  The Court addressed the matter in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The discussion 
here focuses on the confusion between the grant of certiorari in Booker in August 2004 and the subse-
quent ruling in January 2005.  We do not wish to claim too much for Tiresias in this instance, given the 
vast confusion created by the issue.  Not even Tiresias could have allayed all the confusion created by 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and the ultimate result in Booker of rendering the Guide-
lines advisory still may have surprised the legal community (as some dissenting Justices noted in 
Booker).  Nevertheless, we suspect that Tiresias accurately would have indicated that the Court was go-
ing to apply Blakely to the Guidelines. 
245  See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen, Double Standard:  In Wake of Ruling, Disarray Plagues Federal Sen-
tencing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2004, at A1 (discussing problems and uncertainty regarding criminal sen-
tencing pending outcome of Supreme Court ruling). 
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low.246  Tiresias will give these lower courts an informed prediction of how 
the Supreme Court is likely to resolve the issue, which should be helpful for 
the lower courts to consider.247  Of course, Tiresias at most would be per-
suasive information, perhaps analogous in weight to a well-reasoned law 
review article or amicus brief, and no court would ever be obligated to fol-
low a prediction, but the additional information about the collective judg-
ment of the Supreme Court community might be welcomed by individual 
judges and law clerks otherwise making predictions on their own.248  If 
lower courts must guess about the Supreme Court outcomes, let it be the 
most informed guess possible. 
B. For the Supreme Court:  A Mixed Blessing 
The results of Tiresias for the Supreme Court are likely to be mixed:  
an advantage to wise policymaking in the short term, but at the risk in the 
long term of undermining the Court’s legitimacy.  We begin with the ad-
vantages, then consider the long-term consequences to the Court. 
1. Toward More Acceptable Law.—From the initial revolt from Eng-
land, America’s founders believed that public power derived from the con-
sent of the governed.249  Elected federal officials—the President and 
members of Congress—receive feedback from governed citizens quite fre-
 
246  See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 706, 713 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (complaining in dissent that an issue could not be decided without the 
benefit of a pending Supreme Court ruling on a similar case); People v. Garcia, 684 P.2d 826 (Cal. 
1984) (trying to determine what test the Supreme Court would endorse and making predictions); People 
v. Hal Lee Flood, 957 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998) (noting in concurrence that California was still awaiting 
guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue in Garcia fourteen years later); Carl E. Gungoll Explora-
tion Joint Venture v. Kiowa Tribe, 975 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1998) (overturning four cases where the state 
supreme court had not predicted a ruling); Sheehy v. Dep’t of Revenue, 820 P.2d 1257 (Mont. 1991) 
(arguing about whether state supreme court had erred in not predicting outcome of U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling).  In other cases, the state courts wait for the Supreme Court to rule.  See, e.g., Smith v. Regents 
of Univ. of California, 844 P.2d 500, 505 (Cal. 1993); Rushing v. Wayne County, 462 N.W.2d 23, 28 
(Mich. 1990).  
247  To the extent that sufficient numbers of judges and clerks wish to participate, it would be possi-
ble to establish an information market solely for them, perhaps sponsored by the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts.  Yet while Tiresias welcomes judicial participation—judges are among the ultimate 
wolves—we suspect, for reasons discussed above regarding cognitive diversity, that the contributions 
from the specialized Supreme Court bar and press corps will add value to whatever predictions judges 
might make on their own. 
248  Although Tiresias would benefit from the prediction of lower court judges and law clerks, the 
program also could be established to create a judicial exception to the requirement that one must vote to 
learn of a Tiresias prediction.  If this was adopted, it also would let the Supreme Court learn of predic-
tions without having to enter a vote, which might be warranted given its special situation and need to 
avoid tipping off the information market. 
249  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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quently, either through opinion polls or through periodic elections.250  Su-
preme Court Justices currently have life tenure,251 however, and thus, at 
least in theory, need not care at all how the public views their rulings. 
In fact, the Justices appear to care a great deal about public opinion.252  
Empirical studies have demonstrated the correlation between the public 
opinion on controversial issues and how the Court has ruled on those issues 
over time.253  These studies “indicate the existence of a reciprocal and posi-
tive relationship between long-term trends in aggregate public opinion and 
the Court’s collective decisions.”254 
Commentators have argued that the Justices seek to maintain the pub-
lic’s favorable view of the judicial branch by reflecting public opinion in 
Supreme Court rulings.255  In part, the Justices must rely on other branches 
to enforce their decisions, and the best way to legitimate the authority of the 
Court is to have the support of the majority.256  In addition, Justices have re-
putational incentives to follow public opinion.257  Awards, honors, and 
praise from the public as well as legal commentators and practitioners all 
strengthen a Justice’s good reputation.258  In this way public opinion also 
contributes to a particular Justice’s legacy, and how the Justice will be 
viewed after he or she has left the bench.259 
 
250  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (describing election requirement for members of House of Rep-
resentatives); id. art. II, § 2 (describing election process for President); id. amend. XVII (providing for 
direct election of senators).   
251  See generally id. art. III, § 1 (stating that Justices shall hold their offices “during good Behav-
ior”).  There is some intellectual discussion in the academy about whether such life tenure best serves 
the nation.  See, e.g., Charles S. Collier, The Supreme Court and the Principle of Rotation in Office, 6 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 418–19 (1938) (proposing a twelve-member Supreme Court with staggered, 
nonrenewable twelve-year terms for the Justices); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving 
This Honorable Court:  A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered Non-
renewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Contempt of 
Court:  The Most Important “Contemporary Challenge to Judging,” 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 
341–42 (1992) (suggesting limiting Supreme Court Justices to terms of eighteen years); Tony Mauro, 
Profs Pitch Plan for Limits on High Court Service, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at 1.  
252  See generally William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajori-
tarian Institution?:  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
87 (1993); Jeffrey Segal & Helmut Norpoth, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 711, 716 (1994).   
253  See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:  A Preliminary Analysis, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003).  
254  Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 252, at 87.  
255  See Barry Freidman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2611 
(2003). 
256  Id. 
257  Merrill, supra note 253, at 629–30; cf. William G. Ross, The Ratings Game:  Factors That Influ-
ence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401 (1996) (discussing judicial reputation generally). 
258  Merrill, supra note 253, at 629. 
259  Id.  The tangible benefits come in the way of expense-paid speaking engagements and being 
treated with deference in and out of the courtroom. 
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In his book, The Supreme Court:  How It Was, How It Is, the late Chief 
Justice Rehnquist discussed the role that public opinion plays in Supreme 
Court decisionmaking.260  Rehnquist referred to several cases where public 
opinion was a definite factor in the outcome of a ruling.  Although he com-
mented that generally the Justices did not “tremble before public opin-
ion,”261 he argued that, in a case where there is no legal precedent, it would 
be appropriate to take public opinion into consideration.262   
Of course, citizens may disagree about whether it is desirable that pub-
lic opinion influence the Court.  One might argue that the founders intended 
the judiciary to be insulated from prevailing political views, and to the ex-
tent the Court listens closely to others’ expectations in reaching its legal 
conclusions, it drifts from its duty to interpret the law independently.  Cer-
tainly few scholars would defend a Court that routinely decided legal mat-
ters based on current opinion polls instead of precedent and other traditional 
forms of legal authority.  
Without getting mired in this broader debate about the proper degree to 
which public opinion ought to influence the Court, we wish to make a nar-
rower point that information from Tiresias provides a qualitatively different 
form of information to the Court than would be obtainable from traditional 
public opinion polls.  Most obviously, Tiresias’s den of wolves is a far more 
knowledgeable group than a representative sampling of the American pub-
lic.  Pollsters will be unlikely to call ordinary citizens at home to ask about 
their views on Chevron deference.263  In a sense, Tiresias is the poll of those 
individuals most able to understand the issue the Court is facing, which 
gives its data more significance.  Perhaps more important, Tiresias is a pre-
dictive rather than a normative poll; the goal is not to try tell the Justices 
how to cast their votes, but only to predict how they are likely to do so.  The 
Justices have no lack of citizens willing to tell them what to do—they need 
only look out their windows at the frequent protestors on their plaza264—but 
knowing the expectation of the legal community is a different sort of 
knowledge:  more disinterested, focused on actual expectations, and coming 
from more consequential actors—the attorneys who will interpret and ad-
minister the Court’s ruling. 
If the Supreme Court cares about trying to avoid shocking the legal 
community, and one presumes that it does, just as corporations prefer to 
avoid shocking the market with unexpected financial results,265 Tiresias will 
 
260  Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., A Supreme Court Primer for the Public, 1988 DUKE L.J. 203 (reviewing 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT:  HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS (1987)). 
261  Id. at 205 (citation omitted). 
262  Id. at 205, 209–10. 
263  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
264  See, e.g., Karlyn Barker, After 32 Years, Roe Remains a Lightning Rod, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 
2005, at C1 (discussing current protests at the Court by activists on both sides of the abortion debate).   
265  See infra note 280 (discussing analogy between earnings announcements and Supreme Court 
predictions). 
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tell the Court how much its ruling will surprise Court observers.  If the 
Tiresias voting is fairly closely split, the Court can conclude that the issue is 
unpredictable and no one particular outcome will be too surprising.  On the 
other hand, if a substantial majority of Tiresias votes suggest one outcome, 
such a weight of authority by informed observers ought to merit the Court’s 
attention as it ponders how to rule.   
The type of attention from the Court would likely vary with the nature 
of the prediction and the actual outcome.  If the Tiresias expectation is con-
sistent with the Court’s planned decision, the Court can be comforted that 
the decision will not deeply shock its core constituents.  All lawyers still 
may not agree with the Court’s result, but at least the outcome is expected, 
and individuals and institutions have had time to plan for the unfavorable 
ruling and take whatever responsive actions might be possible.266   
Conversely, if Tiresias indicates that a Court ruling is going to surprise 
the legal community, that fact will provide an advance warning to the Court 
of an unexpected and controversial conclusion, a warning that is not always 
present now.  For example, the uproar after Blakely v. Washington over the 
possibility of the unconstitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ap-
parently surprised some Court members,267 prompted a rapid grant of certio-
rari,268 and attracted congressional concern about the decision’s effect on the 
criminal justice system.269  If Tiresias could prevent the Court from walking 
blindly into such a controversy in the future, that information should be 
valuable.   
More broadly, if a divergence exists between a strong Tiresias predic-
tion and how the Court intends to rule, a responsible Court might wish to 
consider why so many knowledgeable legal observers expect a different 
outcome.  If the case involves an unpredictable swing vote going one way 
rather than another in a closely divided constitutional case involving abor-
tion or affirmative action, the confusion could be easily explained.  But par-
ticularly in more nonpolitical or technical areas, such as statutory 
construction in patent law or tax law, a strong Tiresias prediction contrary 
to how the Court intends to rule may suggest that the Court’s intended rul-
 
266  For example, such advance measures might range from settlement of a lawsuit by a corporation 
in advance of the Court ruling to the drafting of potential legislation in Congress to clarify a statutory 
issue before the Court. 
267  See Lyle Denniston, Justices Agree to Consider Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at A14 
(stating that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had indicated that Blakely “looks like a No. 10 earthquake”).   
268  See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Sentencing Controversy Back at High Court, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2004, at 1.  The ultimate decision was issued in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
269  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, 
and Honorable Dianne Feinstein, United States. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105), 
available at 2004 WL 1950640; Orrin G. Hatch, Don’t Throw Justice Into Chaos, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2004, at 62. 
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ing may be mistaken, or at least that it will be widely viewed as mistaken.270  
The Supreme Court, after all, is a small group of decisionmakers, and like 
any small group, it faces the risks of groupthink, information cascades, lim-
ited data and experiences, and even ideological bias.271  Given these limita-
tions of any small group, Tiresias provides the Justices with an opportunity 
to “reality check” their conclusions against the expectation of a larger and 
more diverse legal community.  Such feedback can occur after a Court rul-
ing, of course, but at that time, the feedback is of less help, given the 
Court’s reluctance to overrule even controversial prior decisions.272  If a de-
cision is going to shock the legal community, it is better that the Justices 
know beforehand.  Perhaps it may lead some Justices to change their votes, 
but even if the result does not change, the Court can devote more time in its 
opinion to explaining what will be a surprising result, and thus a longer, 
more thorough opinion may produce increased acceptance of a controver-
sial result.273 
More subtly, the effect of Tiresias over the long term may be, at least 
somewhat, to diffuse public criticism of the Court if the unpopular conclu-
sion is disclosed gradually over time by Tiresias rather than all at once by 
the Court.  That is not to say that various constituencies—ranging from 
Congress to the President to the protestors outside the Court—will not con-
tinue to disagree with certain opinions.  Rather, it is to suggest that a disap-
pointment spread out over time, as the votes on Tiresias begin to pile up 
against one’s favored outcome, may be less upsetting than a sudden unex-
 
270  We acknowledge that it may be controversial to suggest that the Court might be objectively 
“mistaken” when its ruling on any given topic is typically final.  Yet finality is not the same as infallibil-
ity in reaching legal conclusions that are either technically correct or in the nation’s best interest.  Par-
ticularly given the limited ability for society to correct a Supreme Court ruling (often limited to a 
constitutional amendment), the need for carefully considered Court decisions is all the more critical. 
271  As examples of troubling Court decisions, consider Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) 
and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Our point here is not to heap additional criticism on ear-
lier courts—no doubt future centuries, whether liberal or conservative, will have their own criticisms of 
some current decisions.  Rather, we wish to make the narrower point that Justices sometimes can be-
come blinded by their politics, and the Court as an institution can be harmed as a result.  If so, some out-
side warning that such a situation may be developing could be valuable to the Court. 
272  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade 
and stressing the importance of stare decisis). 
273  See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?:  Or Does the 
Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. 
L. REV. 757 (1995).  
The published judicial opinion is the “heart of the common law system.” . . . [A] legal system’s ex-
istence cannot be recognized “until the decisions of its courts are regularly published and are 
available to the bench and bar.”  To the extent our “law” is embodied in precedents, published 
opinions are the authoritative sources of law.  Indeed, stare decisis cannot operate in the absence of 
published opinions. . . . Courts ensure the legitimacy of their decisions by preparing and publish-
ing opinions that explain and justify their reasoning.  And judges and lawyers are utterly depend-
ent upon published opinions to research, evaluate, argue, and decide cases—the most basic of legal 
tasks. 
Id. at 758–59 (footnote omitted). 
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pected blow for which one has little time to prepare.  Just as corporations 
sometimes warn the market about unfavorable news in advance of an earn-
ings statement,274 Tiresias might perform that function in a political context, 
alerting the other governmental branches and interest groups to an ap-
proaching undesired outcome and allowing them to adjust to the possibility.  
Will this reduce hostility toward the ultimate Court ruling?  It would do so 
at most only in part, but sometimes even marginal changes in public percep-
tion can have significant consequences, both for the Court and for the po-
litical leaders who respond to it. 
2. Undermining Mythos?.—Tiresias offers its benefits to the Court, 
but, like most oracles, it probably also will exact a price for this knowledge:  
the potential diminution of the Court’s prestige and legitimacy.  The 
Court’s power is special and inherently somewhat precarious.275  The Su-
preme Court derives much of its power from an idea:  that unelected judges 
can interpret the Constitution with a moral authority to which the political 
branches should defer.276  Underlying this idea are the presumptions that the 
Justices engage in a sort of unbiased search for legal truth, pondering the 
legal issues dispassionately and reaching their enlightened conclusions.  
This sort of mythos is obviously subject to critique,277 but our point here is 
to consider the effect that accurate Tiresias predictions might have on this 
perception of the Supreme Court.278 
At first glance, the predictability of a Supreme Court decision might 
not entail any loss of prestige.  In other contexts, the fact that an event is 
easily predicted need not diminish respect for those who perform it.  The 
Chair of the Federal Reserve Board predictably will be concerned about 
preventing rampant inflation,279 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
274  See, e.g., Karen Talley, Intel’s Gain Lifts Chip Sector:  HCA, Triad Hospitals Advance, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at C2 (stating that UPS’s stock fell 7.4% after warning that fourth-quarter earnings 
would not meet previous expectations).   
275  In contrast, under the Constitution, Congress can tax, spend, and legislate; the President can 
command troops and agencies.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating congressional powers); id. art. 
II, § 2 (enumerating presidential powers).  
276  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
277  Obviously this model of judicial behavior is subject to challenge, as a number of scholars have 
noted.  See supra Part II.A. 
278  One commentator has begun to ask similar questions in response to the Washington University 
Study.  As she describes, in “our deference to the Court’s judgments, we experience a kind of chivalrous 
love—remote, solemn, and unsullied. . . . How might computer prediction of Court decisions displace 
this complex, romantic, yet powerful engagement with law?”  Susan S. Silbey, The Dream of a Social 
Science:  Supreme Court Forecasting, Legal Culture, and the Public Sphere, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 785, 785 
(2004). 
279  See generally, e.g., Fed. Reserve Bd., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/generalinfo/faq/faqmpo.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (“Using the monetary policy tools at its dis-
posal, the Federal Reserve can promote an environment of price stability and reasonably damped fluc-
tuations in overall economic activity that helps foster the health and stability of financial institutions and 
markets.”). 
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predictably will investigate allegations of insider trading,280 and doctors 
predictably will discourage cigarette smoking.  In these instances and in 
many others, the fact that we know what to expect is not only undisturbing 
but even comforting.  Who would welcome doctors telling their patients 
who smoke not to worry about lung cancer? 
Nevertheless, it still feels as if Tiresias, in a sense, would be intruding 
into the Court’s private chambers.281  If Supreme Court decisions can be ac-
curately foretold in advance by an information market, is it still possible 
that the Justices are engaged in dispassionate legal adjudication that war-
rants deference from the Congress, the President, and the population?  Or 
does predictability somehow diminish the Court?  On the one hand, it may 
seem so if the Court could appear to be reduced in most cases to taking the 
final official step of promulgating what an information market already knew 
would occur.  On the other hand, such predictability on legal questions can 
be valuable and respected; some might even call it the rule of law. 
These are questions that are difficult, if not impossible, to answer in 
the abstract.  The ultimate answers will come once a predictive model such 
as Tiresias begins to operate and its predictions begin to attract attention.  
Before then, however, it will be significant how the Supreme Court reacts 
to the prospect of citizens organizing to predict its rulings.  Will the Court 
welcome Tiresias?  If Tiresias cannot be ignored, will the Court discourage 
it?  To the extent that the Court is the most accurate judge of its long-term 
interests, its reaction to the possibility of prediction markets may provide 
the clearest initial answer about what effect Tiresias may have on the my-
thos at the heart of the Supreme Court’s authority. 
C. Moving into the Future:  Tiresias as a Bridge 
A successful Tiresias will significantly advance the application of in-
formation markets and serve as a bridge to further expansion of this excit-
ing new field.  Discussed below are the ways in which Tiresias can add to 
the development of this technology. 
1. Learning from DARPA and Taking the Next, Intermediate Step.—
As discussed above, the advancement of information markets suffered 
a setback with the congressional rejection of DARPA’s Policy Analysis 
 
280  See, e.g., SEC, The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market 
Integrity, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (“Each year the SEC 
brings between 400–500 civil enforcement actions against individuals and companies that break the se-
curities laws.  Typical infractions include insider trading, accounting fraud, and providing false or mis-
leading information about securities and the companies that issue them.”).  
281  Indeed, in one mythological account, the original Tiresias saw the goddess Athena when she was 
naked.  The angry Athena blinded him, and his gift of prophecy was given as compensation.  See 
BULFINCH, supra note 4, at 183.   
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Market (“PAM”).282  Although the congressional opposition certainly has its 
critics,283 we want to focus here on why Tiresias should avoid these prob-
lems and explore ways in which Tiresias might help overcome the setback 
created by PAM’s demise. 
As discussed above,284 PAM encountered political problems and had to 
be abandoned.285  We hope and expect that Tiresias will avoid this fate.  
Predicting Supreme Court outcomes is not as emotionally charged as pre-
dicting terrorism.  In addition, there already exists a noncontroversial aca-
demic tradition of attempting to predict Supreme Court decisions, such as 
the efforts of the Washington University researchers.286  Additionally, the 
participants in Tiresias likely will be informed and responsible analysts, if 
not leaders of the legal system, thereby reducing the likelihood that their ef-
forts will be viewed as irresponsible. 
By avoiding this political controversy and producing accurate results, 
Tiresias should serve as an intermediate step in the development of infor-
mation markets, both with regard to the frequency of predicted events and 
with the frequency of feedback regarding the accuracy of predictions.  With 
regard to number of predicted events, the IEM have shown their worth in 
predicting presidential elections,287 but presidential elections come only 
every four years, which limits their usefulness as a means of assembling a 
large amount of data on predictions, the abilities of information markets, 
and problems that arise in administering such markets.  Presidential elec-
tions were a good beginning, but the next step in the development of this 
technology calls for a larger project.  
On the other extreme, the largest sort of “information market”—the 
world’s financial exchanges—may be too big to analyze and understand 
completely.  Stock markets offer vast opportunities to trade on one’s predic-
tion of the future of a company, but making such a prediction is an extraor-
dinarily difficult task,288 results may not be fully clear for decades, and 
short-term profits or losses may have no connection to genuine predictive 
ability.289  Ultimately, the stock markets may be too large to demonstrate 
easily the predictive capabilities of information markets.  An arena that is 
smaller and more bounded is needed. 
 
282  See, e.g., Hanson, Impolite Innovation, supra note 12, at 14 (“A revival of decision markets in 
the public sector will likely have to wait for a new generation of politicians, or perhaps some stunning 
successes with these mechanisms in the private sector.”).   
283  See, e.g., id.  Hanson was personally involved in designing the DARPA project.  
284  See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text. 
285  We suspect this setback, even with predicting terrorism, is only temporary.  Eventually, as in-
formation markets gain broader public acceptance, the military may be able to use them in the manner 
that Professor Hanson envisioned. 
286  See Ruger et al., supra note 92. 
287  See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
288  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 28, at 234–35. 
289  See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 178, at 75–82 (discussing randomness in market returns).   
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Tiresias is a good fit for this next stage in the development of informa-
tion markets as the technology moves from a limited number of markets to 
a potentially vast application in the future.  In a Term of cases, the Supreme 
Court will offer about one hundred opportunities for prediction, with all re-
sults being provided in less than a year when the Court issues its rulings.290  
This allows for a significantly expanded application of information markets, 
but within a bounded realm where predictions can be quickly ascertained 
and administrative techniques can be refined on a variety of case studies. 
We hope that Tiresias’s successes in this new area will allow for the re-
finement of the administration of information markets, create favorable 
publicity for such undertakings and their accuracy, increase public comfort 
in the idea of prediction efforts (even on the frequently controversial cases 
addressed by the Supreme Court), and generally provide an opportunity to 
advance the development of this important field of analysis.291  To avoid 
losing significant momentum following PAM’s political rejection, the field 
of information markets needs a quick and important victory.  For the rea-
sons discussed above, we think Tiresias may be able to provide this. 
2. Moving Beyond Tiresias.—Beyond Tiresias, the challenge for the 
development of information markets is to identify areas likely to have quick 
and accurate results, succeed in attracting participants, and avoid the politi-
cal controversy that stopped PAM.292  In doing so, it may be helpful to focus 
on narrow subject areas that provide a high-dollar return on predictive 
knowledge to attract talented participants but that are sufficiently technical 
to avoid political controversy. 
A particularly promising area for information markets might be that of 
securities law and regulation.  The field has a limited number of actors293 
but has knowledgeable participants comfortable with the idea of markets 
and a potentially high monetary value for predictive information.294  What is 
the likelihood that the SEC will pass a certain proposed regulation?  How 
 
290  Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 745–46 (2001) (discussing size of docket, and how, in recent years, the 
number of cases heard averages to approximately one hundred); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Rich-
ard Cordray, The Calendar of the Justices:  How the Supreme Court’s Timing Affects Its Decisionmak-
ing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2004) (discussing timing of opinions generally). 
291  There are other potential applications for using Tiresias in a pedagogical setting.  One constitu-
tional law class could have its predictions compared against another, using an internal submarket.  Simi-
larly, law schools could compete to see whose students are best at making predictions. 
292  One idea is an information market focusing on the grant of certiorari.  The successes of these le-
gal information markets would lay the groundwork for more controversial applications in the future, of 
course, once government and the public have become more comfortable with information markets and 
more appreciative of what they can accomplish. 
293  The primary actors are publicly traded corporations with easily identifiable interests, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who also have easily identifiable interests, the courts (particularly in Delaware), and the SEC.  
294  The higher monetary value helps attract knowledgeable traders and provides an incentive to par-
ticipate. 
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likely is a Delaware court to adopt a certain standard of care for directors?295  
Whereas Tiresias will be an information market centered on the institution 
of the Supreme Court, this securities-law information market (“Midas,” 
perhaps?) will be based on a discrete subject area. 
Beyond the area of securities law, information markets can be ex-
panded to the consideration of congressional action.  For example, what is 
the likelihood of certain tort-reform proposals, such as national damage 
caps?296  Undoubtedly groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
American Medical Association, or American Trial Lawyers Association 
would like to know, if only to focus limited lobbying resources.  An infor-
mation market on these types of questions would also allow national or-
ganizations such as large trade associations to benefit from the aggregated 
knowledge of their members about what lobbying efforts are most likely to 
succeed.297  More broadly, any heavily regulated industry might wish ad-
vance knowledge of what government actions might occur, and thus it 
would have an incentive to develop and implement such information mar-
kets.  Tiresias may lead the way with the Supreme Court, but if it proves 
successful, a host of similar projects should follow in various specialized 
subject areas. 
3. How Much Do We Humans Really Know?.—In addition to legal or 
political uses, information markets provide an opportunity to ascertain how 
 
295  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (leading case on good 
faith in Delaware); Sean J. Griffith, The Good Faith Thaumatrope:  A Model of Rhetoric in Corporate 
Law Jurisprudence (Dec. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
571121 (describing and analyzing standard of “good faith” as used by the Delaware courts).  Other 
commentators have discussed predictions of the Delaware equity courts:  
In the oral agreement before the Delaware Supreme Court in QVC, after Justice Moore admon-
ished counsel that the Court does not use terms like “Revlon-land,” in a stage whisper he quipped 
further that “at least that is what I tell my students.”  Trying to discern the future path of Delaware 
corporate law from such judicial banter is undoubtedly folly, but predicting developments in 
Delaware law has always been a somewhat foolish enterprise.  Many learned commentators have 
written careful and lucid analyses predicting the trend of Delaware case law, only to have doctrinal 
prognostications shattered by the next big case.  Predicting the course of Delaware law from prior 
case law is like watching clouds.  They seem, at times, to take on recognizable shapes and forms, 
even to resemble something familiar.  But you know that whatever shapes you think you see can 
vanish in a puff of wind. 
Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Tech-
nicolor:  A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1625–26 (1994) (ci-
tation omitted). 
296  See, e.g., David Rogers, Legislation to Shift Cases from State to Federal Court Builds Bipartisan 
Support, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at A1 (describing ongoing debate over tort reform).   
297  This could be an improvement on traditional polling because it could cheaply include a broader 
voter pool, and given the structure of the information market, allow changes in participant opinion to 
reflect newly obtained data.  It also might allow a national organization quickly to obtain feedback from 
its constituent members on the strategic wisdom of pursuing a certain lawsuit, such as the Chamber of 
Commerce’s challenge to the SEC’s authority to promulgate rules regarding independent members on 
mutual-fund boards of directors. See Judith Burns, SEC Wants Chamber to Back off, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
17, 2005, at C13.   
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much we humans, working collectively, truly know.  The results may be 
surprising, particularly if viewed in comparison with machine intelligence 
and nature where human knowledge often appears scant. 
Consider, for example, the game of chess, a sophisticated challenge 
that presents analogies to other strategic undertakings such as foreign rela-
tions and business competition.  In 1997, IBM’s chess computer Deep Blue 
beat Gary Kasparov, the top human player.298  Where even a human as tal-
ented as Kasparov fails in isolation, might information markets allow fifty 
human chess masters working collectively to beat the machine?  It is possi-
ble that the humans will pull in different directions, fail to develop a coher-
ent strategy, and be trounced.  Alternatively, it is possible that the collective 
chess mind may be stronger than any single player and beat the machine.  
Distributed processing allows computers to succeed at extremely difficult 
tasks; might information markets in effect allow human agents to do the 
same?  The answer seems worth discovering, particularly when information 
markets may have potential application in other strategic endeavors ranging 
from business competition to military planning to economic decisionmak-
ing.299    
More broadly, information markets, including Tiresias, provide an 
epistemological tool to ascertain the limits of human knowledge.  That is, 
applying information markets lets us determine what we know collectively 
and—in some ways just as important—what we do not know, no matter 
how much information is aggregated.  Presidential elections, Supreme 
Court decisions, and even future business earnings are fundamentally hu-
man endeavors.  How effectively might information markets be at predict-
ing natural events like hurricanes, droughts, or epidemics?300  If they fail, 
perhaps that is only to be expected.  What mortals can presume to know the 
mind of God?  But what if such predictions prove accurate?   
In the broadest sense, the overall knowledge of a society is a type of in-
formation market—the “marketplace of ideas,” as it is sometimes called.301  
As people cooperate and share ideas, the collective wisdom and accom-
 
298  See Paul Hoffman, Who’s Best at Chess?:  For Now It’s Neither Man nor Machine, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2003, at B2 (describing current status of competition between humans and chess computers and 
indicating that Kasparov believes that, in a few years, machines will be completely dominant); Seth 
Schiend, With Goggles and a Joystick, Kasparov Takes on ‘Fritz,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at G5; 
Robert Byrne, Chess; Game 2:  Machine Bites Man.  Game 3:  Kasparov Bites Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 2003, § 1, at 145 (describing Kasparov’s draw in competition against Fritz).   
299  Cf. Benkler, supra note 130, at 375. 
300  Efforts in these areas are already under way.  See, e.g., Marilyn Chase, Some Tricks of the Fu-
tures Trade Could Help Predict Flu Outbreaks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8–9, 2005, at B4; Denise Kalette, New 
Futures Market Gambles on Hurricanes, ABCNEWS.COM, July 19, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Technology/wireStory?id=953448&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312&ad=true. 
301  See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket, and that truth is the only ground on which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).  
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plishment grows.302  But if conclusions remain isolated in individual minds, 
society may remain unaware about what its collective wisdom truly knows.  
Applying information markets such as Tiresias, we may begin to find out, 
and in doing so, fulfill the ancient admonition of the Oracle of Delphi:  
Know Thyself. 
 
 
302  See generally ROBERT WRIGHT, NON ZERO (2000) (discussing an apparent historical trend to-
ward greater complexity and communal interaction). 
